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I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that a fundamental transformation has occurred
within the juvenile court movement, away from its original rehabilita-
tive focus and towards a punitive orientation.1  This development has
raised a variety of constitutional issues, some of which the Supreme
Court has already addressed.2  The Court has not, however, directly
focused on the legal implications of administering the punitive sanc-
tion in the juvenile system, but rather has attended only to the sys-
tem’s inability to deliver meaningful rehabilitation.  Thus, in its first
1. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Re-
sponsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 71–86
(1997) [hereinafter Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference
it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets
. . . Punishment]; Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observa-
tions on a Recent Trend, 10 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129 (1987); Andrew Walk-
over, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503,
523–33 (1984); see also infra section II.C (discussing the shift in juvenile courts
from a rehabilitative to a punitive focus).
2. See infra section III.A.
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significant consideration of the workings of the juvenile system, the
Court expressed serious doubt about whether young people subjected
to juvenile court jurisdiction in fact received “the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”3  This disillusion-
ment continued in a line of cases, beginning with In re Gault,4 recog-
nizing that the system imposed harsh dispositions which offered little
meaningful rehabilitation.  As a consequence, the Court required as a
matter of due process that most of the procedural protections constitu-
tionally required in criminal cases, theretofore foreign to juvenile
courts,5 be applied to delinquency adjudications6 within the juvenile
justice system.7  However, when it came to jury trials, the Court made
a glaring exception in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, holding that young
people charged with acts of delinquency do not enjoy a due process
right to a trial by jury.8  In contrast to its previous disparagement of
the rehabilitative potential of the juvenile court movement, the McK-
eiver Court expressed faith that juvenile courts could indeed be func-
tioning components of an effective rehabilitative system in which
juries were not constitutionally required and might actually be harm-
ful to the system’s rehabilitative mission if employed.9
Despite McKeiver’s optimism, the majority of the Court’s opinions
clearly reflect disenchantment with the rehabilitative effectiveness of
3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (holding that juveniles in waiver
proceedings from juvenile to criminal court are entitled to a hearing on waiver
questions, to access to social records available to the juvenile court, and to a
statement of reasons for waiver should the court so decide).  For a more detailed
discussion of Kent, see infra notes 28, 96–99 and accompanying text.
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  For a detailed discussion of the Gault line, see
infra section III.A.
5. The juvenile court movement was founded on the ideal of rehabilitating troubled
youth by offering individualized dispositions according to the child’s needs with-
out the encumbrances of the adversarial model familiar to the criminal law. MAR-
TIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 166 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter
GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING].  Under the guise of parens patriae, juvenile court op-
eratives were to promote the welfare of the juvenile, rendering unnecessary, in-
deed counterproductive, the procedural protections of the criminal system with
its punitive sanction.  Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of
Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 150–51 (1984).  Thus,
juvenile courts traditionally operated without juries, lawyers, rules of evidence,
and formal procedures. Id.
6. The Court spoke specifically to “delinquency adjudications,” thus leaving open
the question of whether or not its procedural requirements also applied to other
stages of delinquency proceedings or to matters concerning status offense juris-
diction of juvenile courts. See GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 5, at 251–52
(discussing distinctions drawn by some courts between procedures employed in
delinquency cases, on the one hand, and status offense matters on the other).
7. See infra section III.A.
8. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).  For a detailed discussion of
McKeiver, see infra subsection III.A.1.
9. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547, 550.
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the juvenile system.  This sentiment is shared by policy makers
throughout the nation who have increasingly embraced punishment of
juvenile offenders.10  Policy merits aside, however, imposing punitive
sanctions raises constitutional issues—yet to be decided by the
Court—unique and distinct from those attending rehabilitative dispo-
sitions.11  Specifically, punishing juvenile offenders requires recogni-
tion of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial by jury, whatever
McKeiver’s due process validity and assumptions of a rehabilitative
model.  Yet, despite widespread criticism from commentators,12 the
10. See supra note 1.  Some see the Court’s actions themselves as being, at least
partly, the cause of the emergence of punitive juvenile justice.  Chief Justice Bur-
ger warned that requiring the procedures of the criminal system would render
the juvenile system the functional equivalent of the criminal law, resulting in the
eventual merger of the two systems:
What the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the trap-
pings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court sys-
tem requires breathing room and flexibility in order to survive . . . .
. . . .
. . .  I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to transform
juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what we are well on the
way to accomplishing.  We can only hope the legislative response will not
reflect our own by having these courts abolished.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Some com-
mentators see the movement towards punitive juvenile justice as a realization of
Burger’s fears. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent
Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 24 (2007)
[hereinafter Feld, Unmitigated Punishment]; Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconcep-
tualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Sci-
ence, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 965–66 (2006) (discussing the Court’s case law among
the factors bringing Burger’s fears “close to fruition”).  Professor Feld has stated:
[T]he Court’s decisions transformed juvenile courts into scaled-down
criminal courts. . . .  By making explicit the connection between delin-
quency and criminality, the Court placed the sub-group of delinquents
within the larger social problem of criminals.  This functional
equivalency increased the likelihood that harsher policies aimed at
criminals would spill over onto delinquents as well.
Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra, at 24.  Other commentators have
observed:
[W]hile not the intent of many proponents of greater due process for
juveniles, procedural reforms did have a latent impact on the objectives
of the juvenile justice system and its correctional interventions.  With
the advent of rules, generalizable standards, and requirements for proce-
durally correct decisions, attention began to be focused on substantive
issues such as the equal and fair treatment of offenders rather than on
individualized, situation-specific considerations.  As a result, the offense,
rather than the offender, came to be a critical factor in juvenile court
dispositional decisionmaking.
Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
323, 331 (1991).
11. See infra notes 37–44, 76–77 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083,
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 5
overwhelming majority of courts continue to rely on McKeiver as the
basis for unjustifiably denying jury trials to delinquents facing puni-
tive sanctions, which would trigger jury trial rights in adult criminal
court.13
This Article argues that the continued homage to McKeiver in an
era of punitive juvenile justice is the misguided result of judicial inat-
tention to the distinction between punitive and rehabilitative disposi-
tions.  In Part II, I clarify this distinction and demonstrate why
understanding it is essential to a sound analysis of whether jury de-
terminations and public proceedings are constitutionally required in
delinquency adjudications.  I show that the concepts of rehabilitation
and punishment are distinct and, for purposes of constitutional analy-
sis, mutually exclusive.  From this discussion I derive a conceptual
framework, which I apply in Part IV to analyze several cases.  These
conceptual considerations are framed by a sketch of the movement
within juvenile justice from a rehabilitative to a punitive model.  In
Part III, I examine the Supreme Court’s delinquency cases, paying
particular attention to McKeiver.  I then consider the Court’s public
1123–26 (1991) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts]; Janet E.
Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile
Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 943 (1995) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Youth
Justice]; Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban on Jury Trials in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 875 (1994–1995); Barry C. Feld,
The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhance-
ments Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1136–69 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Consti-
tutional Tension]; Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Ju-
ries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 553 (1998); Orman W. Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The
Last Word on Juvenile Court Adjudications?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 561 (1972); Jo-
seph B. Sanborn Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need for Today’s Juve-
nile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230 (1993); Kristin K. Zinsmaster, In re the Welfare of
Due Process, 94 MINN. L. REV. 168 (2009); Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They
Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds? The Case for Providing Louisiana’s
Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161 (2004); Cart Rixey, Note, The Ultimate Disillusion-
ment: The Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications, 58 CATH. U. L. REV.
885 (2009).
But see Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for
Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447 (2000) (arguing for a new paradigm based on
“procedural justice theory” rather than the adversarial model); Courtney P. Fain,
What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile “Adjudications” with
Criminal “Convictions”, 49 B.C. L. REV. 495 (2008) (explaining that jury trials are
a bad idea for juvenile courts because juveniles rarely invoke them, and jury use
would make juvenile adjudications “convictions” for adult sentencing purposes);
Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice:
Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (2006) (sug-
gesting that the adversarial system and jury determinations may be less suited
to juvenile courts than “procedural justice” models).
13. See infra section IV.A.
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trial and jury trial case law and argue that proceedings must be open
to the public when alleged offenders face punishment, and jury trials
must be afforded when they face substantial punitive incarceration.  I
show that, contrary to McKeiver, requiring open jury determinations
in delinquency adjudications will not detract from the goals of such
proceedings but will actually effectuate them.  I conclude Part III by
arguing that alleged delinquents, unlike adult defendants in the crim-
inal system, are constitutionally entitled to choose a jury or bench
trial and an open or closed proceeding in which their identities are
kept confidential.
In Part IV, I examine a sample of lower court cases considering
whether jury trials are required in the new punitive juvenile justice.  I
demonstrate that the courts, with very few exceptions, make three
kinds of mistakes in assessing jury trial rights in juvenile cases.  Some
courts simply beg the constitutional question by assuming without
analysis that a given disposition is nonpunitive.  Others apply overly
broad definitions of rehabilitation, thereby conflating the concept of
punishment into that of rehabilitation.  A third group makes the oppo-
site mistake by applying the “impact theory,” an overly broad defini-
tion of punishment, which conflates the concept of rehabilitation and
other coercive sanctions into that of punishment.  After illustrating
these mistakes with examples from the case law, I contrast the faulty
decisions with a rare example of a soundly analyzed case as a recom-
mended model for clarification of the muddled situation created by the
lower courts.
Finally, in Part V, I briefly address the argument of some leading
commentators that the complete criminalization of juvenile courts—
by the recognition of public trial and jury trial rights—makes the exis-
tence of a juvenile court system separate from the criminal justice sys-
tem unnecessary and unwise.  Rather than merging it into the
criminal system, I argue to the contrary that the emergence of puni-
tive juvenile justice with full procedural protections actually provides
a new rationale for retaining a separate juvenile court system.  I take
no position on whether juvenile courts should punish delinquents, but
focus only on the Sixth Amendment implications that follow when
punishment occurs.
II. JUVENILE JUSTICE: FROM REHABILITATION
TO PUNISHMENT
In this Part, I will describe the original rehabilitative orientation
of the juvenile justice movement as a prelude to discussing the in-
creasing emergence of the punitive sanction currently utilized in
many juvenile systems around the nation.  To better understand this
transformation of juvenile justice, I will then clarify the distinction
between rehabilitative and punitive dispositions and explain the legal
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 7
significance of the distinction.  Finally, I will document the emergence
of punishment in modern juvenile justice.
A. The Rehabilitative Premise of Original Juvenile Justice
Until the late nineteenth century, no separate court system existed
to process juveniles who committed criminal offenses or who simply
were in need of care or supervision.14  Prior to that time, young people
committing criminal offenses were dealt with through the same crimi-
nal court system and were subject to the same array of punishments
as were adult offenders.15  The common law did provide, however, an
infancy defense which reflected the understanding that children are
less capable than adults of appreciating the wrongfulness of their ac-
tions, thus rendering them less culpable and less deterrable than their
adult counterparts.16  This defense constituted a series of presump-
tions: first, children under the age of seven were conclusively pre-
sumed incapable of possessing criminal responsibility and were thus
outside the jurisdiction of the criminal law; second, children between
ages seven and fourteen were subject to a rebuttable presumption of
non-responsibility;17 and third, adolescents over the age of fourteen
were treated as adults.18
However, at the dawn of the twentieth century—with the emerging
science of psychology providing new perceptions into the nature of
crime and an appreciation of the differences between young people
and adults—progressive reformers established a court system unique
to juveniles, aimed at rehabilitating those committing criminal of-
fenses as well as those exhibiting problematic behavior not proscribed
by the criminal law.19  After its initial implementation in 1899 in Illi-
nois,20 the movement quickly spread to every United States jurisdic-
tion and to most European nations.21  This movement was predicated
14. The establishment of the first juvenile court occurred in Cook County, Illinois in
1899. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1
(2d ed. 2011).  Prior to that time legal reformers established “houses of refuge” in
the early nineteenth century to protect orphans, paupers, and juveniles convicted
of offenses in criminal courts. Id. at 1–2.
15. Walkover, supra note 1, at 509.
16. Id. at 509–12.
17. The presumption could be overcome if the state could show that the young defen-
dant in fact appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her actions. Id. at 510–11.
18. Id.
19. See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 822–25;
Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Develop-
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137, 141 (1997).
20. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 1.
21. See Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal
Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451
(1985).
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on the view that young people are by their nature malleable, and thus
prime candidates for rehabilitation.22  At the same time, the move-
ment also saw juveniles as unfit subjects for punishment because
their immaturity rendered them neither culpable23 nor deterrable.24
Thus, as a manifestation of parens patriae power,25 the juvenile court
movement sought to meet the needs of youthful offenders rather than
sanction them for their offenses.26  Dispositions were “indeterminate,”
possibly extending throughout the period of minority and based on the
best interests of the offender, rather than “determinate” in proportion
to the minor’s offenses.27
Consistent with its rehabilitative ideals, the juvenile justice sys-
tem traditionally eschewed procedural formalities in favor of closed
22. Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 142.  Young people were not the sole subjects of
the “rehabilitative ideal.”  Progressive reformers had come to believe that all
criminal conduct was determined by underlying conditions affecting the offender
rather than the product of his free choices. Id. at 141.  Thus, treatment rather
than punishment was also the preferred disposition for adult offenders, although
perhaps not as effectively employed as in the case of their more malleable juve-
nile counterparts. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
23. See Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV.
659, 661–64 (1970).  While juvenile courts assumed jurisdiction over troubled
youths in general, not just those committing criminal offenses, the discussion
throughout this Article will focus only on those committing offenses that would be
crimes if committed by an adult.  Such offenders are generally characterized as
“delinquents” in juvenile justice parlance. See GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING, supra
note 5, at 167.
24. Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 143.  The juvenile court movement thus ex-
tended the underlying predicates of the infancy defense not just to children under
the age of fourteen but to all young people under the age of majority.
25. The original English concept of parens patriae, applied historically by chancery
courts, permitted courts to exercise the Crown’s paternal prerogative to declare a
child a ward of the Crown when the parents had failed to maintain the child’s
welfare. See generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to
the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971).
26. The fundamental concern of juvenile courts towards child offenders was with
“what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.”
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909).  In
adopting reformation as its goal, the juvenile court movement eschewed retribu-
tivist notions of guilt and blameworthiness.  Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of
the Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 181, 207 (1977).
27. The rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile system were characterized by a sys-
tem of indeterminate sentencing in which the type and duration of sanction were
dictated by the “best interests” of the offender rather than the seriousness of the
offense.  Stephan Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice:
Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120,
1121 (1977).  “Indeterminate” meant that the disposition had no set limit and
could continue until adulthood.  Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A
Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 196 n.37
(2007) [hereinafter Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice].
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proceedings without defense lawyers or juries.28  The proceedings
were themselves deemed rehabilitative, with the judge acting as a fa-
ther figure ready to sit next to the youth and “on occasion put his arm
around his shoulders and draw the lad to him” in a show of “care and
solicitude.”29  In order to dispense needed rehabilitation on a case-by-
case basis, the proceedings were nonadversarial, with judges often
acting more as social workers than legal officials,30 and with lawyers
replaced by an array of sociologists, social workers, and mental health
professionals who provided the court with input thought necessary to
“save children from a life of crime”31 and “develop [the accused into] a
worthy citizen.”32
28. One commentator summarized the matter as follows:
Not only was the aim of a court for children to differ from that of the
criminal court; its way of going about things was to be changed as well.
Procedure had to be socialized.  The purpose of the juvenile court is to
prevent the child’s being tried and treated as a criminal; all means
should be taken to prevent the child and his parents from forming the
conception that the child is being tried for a crime.  The respondent to a
petition filed in his own interest replaced the defendant to a criminal
charge filed in the interest of the state.  Trials by jury should be permit-
ted under no circumstances, because they are inconsistent with both the
law and the theory upon which children’s codes are founded.  Hearings
were not to be public trials lest youngsters be damaged by publicity.  Lit-
tle or no need would be found for the respondent to have a lawyer; the
judge represents both parties and the law.  The proceedings were to be
informal . . . .  The rules of evidence governing criminal cases were not to
be strictly followed.  In part, they were to be rejected because the inquiry
was to be broader than the relatively simple question: Did the child do
it?  The inquiry was also to consider medical and psychological informa-
tion, the impressions of trained observers, in order to understand the
Reason Why. . . .  In short, the ordinary protections of a person accused
of crime were hindrances to the achievement of juvenile court goals, not
milestones on the path of human advancement.
Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juve-
nile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 170–71 (footnotes and internal quotation
marks omitted).
29. Mack, supra note 26, at 120.
30. In the early days of the juvenile court movement, judges were sometimes not
even trained in the law. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544
n.4 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“A recent study of juvenile court
judges . . . revealed that half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had
received no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the bar.”); L.
Mara Dodge, “Our Juvenile Court Has Become More Like a Criminal Court”: A
Century of Reform at the Cook County (Chicago) Juvenile Court, 26 MICH. HIST.
REV. 51, 58 n.25 (2000) (noting that as of 1973 only 85% of juvenile court judges
had law degrees). See generally Kathleen Coulborn Faller & Frank E. Vander-
vort, Interdisciplinary Clinical Teaching of Child Welfare Practice to Law and
Social Work Students: When World Views Collide, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 121,
123 n.5 (2007).
31. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 225 (2011).
32. Mack, supra note 26, at 107.
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As a “civil” system aimed at avoiding the stigma attached to the
criminal justice system, the juvenile court movement adopted a set of
euphemisms to replace the terminology of the criminal law.  Juvenile
proceedings were thus triggered by “petitions” rather than “indict-
ments” or “informations”; juveniles committed acts of “delinquency”
rather than “crimes”; they were subject to “adjudications” rather than
“trials”; and if adjudicated a delinquent, they discovered their fate in
“disposition” rather than “sentencing” proceedings, which could lead
to commitment to a “training school” rather than a “prison” or
“penitentiary.”33
While juvenile courts were meant to function as rehabilitative al-
ternatives to the criminal system, the juvenile justice system—virtu-
ally from its inception—provided mechanisms to waive juvenile court
jurisdiction to adult criminal court in certain cases.34  Once waived to
criminal court, juveniles enjoyed all the protections of the criminal
process but became subject to the same array of punishments imposed
upon convicted adults.35  Notwithstanding the possibility of waiver to
criminal court, however, the reformers believed as a fundamental
matter of public policy that juveniles generally should not be punished
for their offenses but instead rehabilitated.
The new “civil” rehabilitative system was thus promoted as a desir-
able nonpunitive alternative to the criminal system.  In choosing be-
tween systems that punish and those that rehabilitate, the reformers
were not merely making an important policy decision,36 but also one of
33. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 5, at 167.
34. “In 1903, only four years after its establishment, the Chicago juvenile court
transferred fourteen children to the adult criminal system.”  Stephen Wizner,
Discretionary Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: An Invitation to Procedural
Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 42 (1984).  Such a trend continued into
the 1970s, when every American jurisdiction had laws authorizing or requiring
criminal prosecution of certain minors in adult courts. Id.; see also Barry C. Feld,
Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative
to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516 n.5 (1978) (discuss-
ing the varied terminology used to describe the juvenile waiver procedure).
Waiver is generally reserved for those youths whose “highly visible, serious, or
repetitive criminality raises legitimate concern for public safety or community
outrage.”  Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the “Rehabilitative Ideal”, 65 MINN. L. REV. 167,
171 (1980).  However, many youths committing minor offenses are also dealt with
in criminal court, perhaps because of the unavailability of fines as a juvenile
court sanction. See Wizner, supra, at 44–45.
35. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 213.  Recently, however, the Supreme Court has found
that certain punishments constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment when applied to offenders who commit their crimes while
under eighteen years of age. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (life
sentence without parole for non-homicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (death penalty).
36. At the same time the rehabilitative ideal was being embodied in the new juvenile
movement, similar policies were enacted in the criminal law as indeterminate
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constitutional significance.  Punitive systems are governed by consti-
tutional requirements, some substantive37 and others procedural,
under various Bill of Rights provisions applicable to “criminal” cases38
and “prosecutions.”39  Among these requirements is that defendants
must be afforded public trials with rights to jury determinations.40
On the other hand, such rights do not necessarily apply to proceedings
dispensing nonpunitive sanctions, such as coerced rehabilitation.41
Moreover, distinguishing punishment from rehabilitation is constitu-
tionally necessary in light of the Court’s proclamation in Robinson v.
California42 that a person may never be “punished” under the Eighth
sentencing emerged in the attempt to rehabilitate adult offenders within prisons,
if possible, and restrain them therein if dangerous but not able to be rehabili-
tated. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 9–10 (1976).
37. The presence of punishment is a necessary predicate for relief under the Bill of
Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See, e.g., Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (finding that requiring registration of convicted sex
offenders with law enforcement authorities is “nonpunitive” and thus not a viola-
tion of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (find-
ing state Sexually Violent Predator Act “nonpunitive” under Ex Post Facto
Clause); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding termination of social
security benefits not “punishment” for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
“Punishment” is also necessary for violations of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 670 n.39 (1976) (“[A]n imposition must be ‘punishment’ for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause to apply.”).
Moreover, administering “punishment” prior to conviction or guilty plea con-
stitutes a violation of due process.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (stat-
ing that “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to
an adjudication of guilt,” but holding there was no “punishment” of pretrial de-
tainees where confinement was imposed for nonpunitive purposes).
38. Among other things, the Fifth Amendment requires grand jury indictments in
charging infamous “crime[s]” and forbids compelling persons to be witnesses
against themselves in any “criminal case.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (holding that civil commit-
ment proceedings are not “punitive” in purpose, and hence are not “criminal
cases” uniquely requiring proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”—proof by “clear and
convincing evidence” therefore was sufficient in civil commitment matters).  For a
comprehensive discussion of the variety of legal consequences of the punitive/
nonpunitive distinction, see generally J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penal-
ties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV.
379 (1976).
42. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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Amendment for undesirable status conditions, which may, however,
spawn compulsory rehabilitation or medical “treatment.”43  Thus, if a
juvenile justice system were in fact “punitive,” even if nominally “re-
habilitative,” it would become a “criminal” legal system subject to
those requirements unique to state dispensations of punishment.44
Later in this Part, I will show that juvenile justice has become in-
creasingly punitive.  Before examining this development, however, it
is necessary to provide an analytical framework for differentiating be-
tween punitive and rehabilitative dispositions.  Without a clear under-
standing of the difference between punishment and rehabilitation, it
is impossible to appreciate the extent of the metamorphosis of juvenile
justice and to assess whether in its current form Sixth Amendment
jury and public trial rights apply to delinquency adjudications.
43. Id. at 666–68 (holding state may require drug addict to undergo compulsory
treatment, but may not punish him for the status of drug addiction). See In re De
La O, 378 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a confinement of petitioner for six
months to five years for drug addiction constituted permissible treatment and
rehabilitation rather than impermissible punishment under Robinson).
For my assessment of Robinson as a due process rather than an Eighth
Amendment case, see Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v. California in
the Wake of Jones v. Los Angeles: Avoiding the “Demise of the Criminal Law” by
Attending to “Punishment”, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (2008) [hereinafter
Gardner, Rethinking].
44. “Criminal” is distinguished from “civil” law by the former’s imposition of punish-
ment.  Professor George Fletcher explains:
The best candidate for a conceptual proposition about the criminal
law is that the infliction of “punishment” is sufficient to render a legal
process criminal in nature.  In the United States, the labeling of a pro-
cess as “criminal” triggers certain basic constitutional guarantees, such
as the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial.  As a test for when
processes are criminal, the Supreme Court unhesitatingly invokes the
concept of “punishment” as the relevant criterion.  That a sanction is in-
flicted in the criminal courts for a violation of the criminal code is suffi-
cient to classify the sanction as “punitive,” but there are recurrent
problems in assessing the punitive nature of other sanctions, such as
administrative commitment, expatriation, deportation, fines for custom
violations and the deprivation of social security benefits.  That the legis-
lature has identified these sanctions as civil in nature does not control
the constitutional issue, for if the sanction is “punitive,” if it constitutes
“punishment,” then regardless of the legislative label, the process is
criminal and the constitutional guarantees apply.  If we wish to under-
stand the criminal law, we must first understand its most prominent
feature: the infliction of punishment.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 408–09 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 13
B. Punitive vs. Rehabilitative Dispositions:  The Conceptual
Distinction
1. Punishment
Notwithstanding the unique legal significance of governmental im-
position of punishment,45 the Supreme Court has struggled to provide
a precise definition of the punitive sanction.46  Elsewhere, I have ex-
amined in detail the Court’s cases determining whether a given gov-
ernmental action constitutes “punishment.”47  From these cases, it is
possible to make the following general observations: a sanction is pu-
nitive if a legislature labels it punitive,48 and the Court will otherwise
defer to the legislature if it labels a sanction nonpunitive and civil un-
less a party challenging the sanction shows by the “clearest proof” that
it is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s]
intention to deem it civil.”49  Moreover, in addressing the question of
punitive purpose or effect, the Court routinely appeals to the “useful
guideposts”50 established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,51 where
45. See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text.
46. The Court first attempted to define punishment in mid-nineteenth century cases
arising under the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses. See Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (finding that a teacher–priest was uncon-
stitutionally punished by imposition of a $500 fine for continuing to teach with-
out taking a required oath of allegiance to the Union under a state constitutional
provision enacted after the teacher had begun teaching).  For a detailed discus-
sion of Cummings, see Martin R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A
Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders,
35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798–800 (1982) [hereinafter Gardner, Punishment and Ju-
venile Justice].
47. See Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 797–822; Gard-
ner, Rethinking, supra note 43, at 466–73.
48. The Court has characterized the framework described immediately hereafter in
the text as the “well established” basis for determining the presence of punish-
ment.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  The framework has been followed
explicitly by the Court in the following cases: id. at 92 (holding mandatory regis-
tration by sex offenders not to be punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto
Clause); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (holding monetary penalties
and occupational debarment not to be punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding commit-
ment of sex offender at completion of prison sentence not to be punishment for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses); United States v.
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding forfeiture of property not to be punishment
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
373–74 (1986) (holding commitment as a “sexually dangerous person[ ]” not pun-
ishment for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (holding under the Due Process Clause that pretrial
detention was not punishment “prior to an adjudication of guilt”).
49. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (alteration in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 97 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99).
51. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that forfeiture of
citizenship rights for fleeing the United States to avoid the draft constituted
14 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1
the Court articulated “the tests traditionally applied to determine
whether [a sanction] is penal . . . in character.”52  These “tests” include
the following:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears exces-
sive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.53
These considerations demonstrate that punishment entails the
purposeful imposition by the state of unpleasantness (“an affirmative
disability or restraint”) upon one engaging in undesirable “behavior”
for purposes of exacting “retribution” and achieving “deterrence.”  So
understood, punishment imposes unpleasantness upon a person as a
response to his or her commission of an undesirable act.54  Further-
more, the Court’s attention to “scienter” in Mendoza-Martinez sug-
“punishment,” thus triggering the protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments).  For an insightful discussion of the Mendoza-Martinez decision,
see George Fletcher, Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth
Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
290 (1965).
52. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
53. Id. at 168–69 (footnotes omitted).  While the Mendoza-Martinez factors have
proven useful in determining punishment and distinguishing it from nonpunitive
coercive sanctions, the Court’s reference to whether a sanction “appears excessive
in relation to the alternative [nonpunitive] purpose[s] assigned” has proven prob-
lematic. Id. at 169.  The Court has suggested that a sanction is punitive if it is
excessive in light of articulated nonpunitive purposes.  In discussing the issue of
whether pretrial detention constituted punishment (unconstitutional unless it
follows conviction), the Court observed: “[I]f a restriction or condition [of pretrial
detention] is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or pur-
poseless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental
action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees
qua detainees.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).  Arbitrary or purpose-
less coercive actions by the government do not necessarily constitute punishment,
however. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding
guard brutality of jail inmate not “punishment” under Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause but rather a “spontaneous attack” likely
in violation of the Due Process Clause).  I have argued elsewhere that unless the
sanction is imposed “for an offense” however arbitrary or purposeless it may be, it
is not “punishment.” See Gardner, Rethinking, supra note 43, at 464–66, 473–81.
54. This view of the Court’s conception tracks fairly closely to H.L.A. Hart’s famous
characterization of the “standard case” of legal punishment:
(i) [Punishment] must involve pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than
the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by
a legal system against which the offence is committed.
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gests that punishment is characteristically imposed on those believed
blameworthy for their undesirable actions.55  Thus, the state punishes
when it purposely visits unpleasant consequences upon blameworthy
offenders who have violated legal rules.
Although the Court has not focused on the matter, philosophical
literature on the subject has emphasized an additional factor central
to the concept of punishment.  Because punishment is a response to a
past action, it is “determinate” in the sense that its intensity and du-
ration is determined by the seriousness of the action to which it re-
sponds.56  As one commentator puts it, “we would be punishing
someone” if, in addition to imposing unpleasantness upon an offender
by virtue of the fact that he or she culpably acted, “we determined—
within at least some limits—at the time of our decision to punish what
the nature and magnitude of the [inflicted] unpleasantness would
be.”57
In summary, the Court’s cases and the philosophical literature re-
veal the following framework for determining whether a given sanc-
tion is punitive:
(1) If the sanction is labeled punitive by the legislature, it is con-
clusively presumed to be so.
H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4–5 (1969).
55. This focus on blameworthiness as a fundamental precondition for punishment is
also emphasized by Richard Wasserstrom, who defines punishment as follows:
I think that we would be punishing someone if:
1. We believed that he or she had done some action; and
2. We believed that he or she was responsible at the time he or she ac-
ted; and
3. We believed that his or her action was blameworthy; and
4. We publicly inflicted some unpleasantness upon him or her; and
5. We publicly inflicted that unpleasantness upon him or her in virtue of
the fact that he or she did the action in question, that he or she was
responsible when he or she acted, and that he or she was blameworthy
for having so acted . . . .
Richard Wasserstrom, Some Problems with Theories of Punishment, in JUSTICE
AND PUNISHMENT 173, 179 (J.B. Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977).
56. Punitive sentences are thus in a sense “fixed” or determined by principles of pro-
portionality between offense and punishment. See, e.g., Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens
Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CALIF. L. REV. 463, 507 (1967).  Justice Scalia
has identified judicial imposition of fixed periods of incarceration on uncoopera-
tive litigants as the basis for distinguishing “criminal” contempt from “civil” con-
tempt, which is characterized as confinement until a litigant complies with a
specific order of the court.  Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 521 U.S.
821, 840 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Wasserstom, supra note 55, at 179; see also Herbert Morris, Persons and Punish-
ment, in PUNISHMENT 74, 78 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1975) (noting
that “with punishment there is an attempt at some equivalence between the ad-
vantage gained by the wrongdoer—partly based upon the seriousness of the in-
terest invaded, partly on the state of mind with which the wrongful act was
performed—and the punishment meted out”).
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(2) If the legislative label or intent indicates that the sanction is
“civil,” it will be presumed to be so unless it is shown “by the
clearest proof” to be punitive under the following conception of
punishment:
(a) The sanction involves an unpleasant restraint purposely
imposed by the state;
(b) The sanction is imposed upon a person because of an
offense;
(c) The sanction is imposed to achieve the purposes of punish-
ment—retribution and deterrence;
(d) The extent and duration of the unpleasant restraint is
known, within some possible limits, at the time of its impo-
sition; and
(e) The sanction is generally imposed upon offenders deemed
to be blameworthy.58
As noted above, it is necessary to distinguish punitive and rehabili-
tative dispositions in order to sort out a variety of constitutional is-
sues, including the public trial and jury trial questions.59  Therefore,
an understanding of how coercive rehabilitation differs from punish-
ment is essential.
58. Unlike provisions (2)(a)–(d), a finding of blameworthiness is not a necessary con-
dition for the definition of punishment given the Supreme Court’s recognition of
the validity of strict liability crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250 (1922).  The relationship between punishment and responsibility is thus not
a logical one.  As recognized by H.L.A. Hart, it is logically possible—although not
justifiable—for the state to knowingly punish a person who is known to be inno-
cent of the offense for which he is punished. See Hart, supra note 54; see also
JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 12–13 (1973) (discussing the utility defi-
nition of punishment and its relation to the innocent).  For a discussion of the
Hart view, see Gardner, Rethinking, supra note 43, at 464–65.
Not everyone agrees, however, that blameworthiness is not a necessary condi-
tion for the definition of punishment.  Some argue that the power of punishment
to express social disapprobation toward morally blameworthy offenders is the
central characteristic that distinguishes punishment from nonpunitive sanctions.
See, e.g., Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and
all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which
accompanies and justifies its imposition.”); see also Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RE-
SPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970) (arguing that judgments of disapproval and reproba-
tion are part of the definition of legal punishment).
59. See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text.  Leading theorists have noted the
significance of distinguishing rehabilitation, often characterized as “treatment”
or “therapy,” from punishment. See, e.g., TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUP-
POSED JUSTIFICATIONS 1 (1969); Morris, supra note 57; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 25–28 (1968); Wasserstrom, supra note 55.
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2. Rehabilitation
Because coercive rehabilitation often entails significant depriva-
tions of liberty,60 it is sometimes mistakenly considered punitive in
nature.61  Similarly, as will be discussed later,62 punitive dispositions
are sometimes mistaken for rehabilitation in juvenile justice cases.  In
fact, however, in many ways, therapeutic or rehabilitative dispositions
are premised on principles directly opposite to those defining punish-
ment.  While punishment entails the purposeful infliction of suffering
upon its recipient, rehabilitation involves purposeful behavior towards
its recipient intended to alter the recipient’s condition in a beneficial
manner.63  In contrast to punishment, rehabilitation is directed at re-
60. In juvenile justice, custodial confinement in “training schools” or “industrial
schools” for purposes of rehabilitation has been a dispositional alternative from
the beginning of the juvenile court movement. See GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 5, at 281–82.
61. Some have defined sanctions as punitive simply if the conditions entailed in the
sanction are experienced as unpleasant by their recipients.  Thus, if the “impact”
of a sanction is to visit upon its recipient unpleasant restrictions similar to those
experienced by persons who are punished—similar, for example to deprivations
existing in prisons—then the sanction is considered “punishment” regardless of
the state’s purpose in administering it. See Developments in the Law—Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1331 (1974) (footnote
omitted) (“Under an ‘impact’ theory of punishment, if an individual is subjected to
deprivations similar to those existing in prisons, those deprivations are deemed
to constitute punishment.”).  A federal judge expressed the view this way: “It
would be impossible, without playing fast and loose with the English language,
for a court to examine the conditions of confinement under which detainees are
incarcerated, . . . and conclude that their custody was not punitive in effect if not
in intent.”  Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 380 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, C.J.,
dissenting); see also Lieggi v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 389 F.
Supp. 12, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (“[T]he overall effect, the reality of the situation, is
that petitioner . . . and his family will suffer severe punishment in relation to the
offense unless this Court grants him some form of relief.”), rev’d 529 F.2d 530
(7th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing
the Double Jeopardy Clause’s Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J. 632
(1981) (opining that intent of a challenged practice is irrelevant in defining
punishment).
The impact theory provides an inadequate definition of punishment.  If pun-
ishment is defined solely in terms of the impact of a sanction on its recipient,
without regard to questions of motivation for imposing it, virtually all coercive
sanctions would become punitive, thus making it impossible to draw necessary
distinctions between, inter alia, punishment and coercive rehabilitation. See
PACKER, supra note 59, at 19–31; Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice,
supra note 46, at 811–13.  For examples of courts resorting to the impact theory,
see infra subsection IV.A.3.
62. See infra subsections IV.A.1 & IV.A.2.
63. See PACKER, supra note 59, at 25 (“[T]he justification for [rehabilitation] rests on
the view that the person subjected to it is or probably will be ‘better off’ as a
consequence.”); Wasserstrom, supra note 55, at 179 (“[W]e would be treating
someone if . . . [w]e acted in [a] way . . . [which] would alter [the recipient’s]
condition in a manner beneficial to him or her.”).
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lieving unpleasantness in its recipient’s life rather than inflicting it.
Moreover, while punishment always responds to actions deemed unde-
sirable, rehabilitation aims at alleviating present status conditions
deemed unhealthy.64  While actions may be symptomatic of one’s pre-
sent unhealthy condition, they are not necessary predicates for reha-
bilitation.65  As punishment responds to the commission of offenses,
rehabilitation responds to the needs of the person, whether or not he
or she has committed offenses.  Finally, unlike punitive dispositions,
which are determinate in nature,66 rehabilitative dispositions are in-
determinate at the time of their imposition because it is impossible to
know at that time how long it will take to rehabilitate a given
offender.67
3. Punishment v. Rehabilitation:  Mutually Exclusive
Dispositions?
In light of the above discussion, it is not surprising that many see
punishment and coercive treatment or rehabilitation as mutually ex-
64. PACKER, supra note 59, at 25–26; Wasserstrom, supra note 55, at 179.
65. Offending conduct is the sine qua non of punishment but is not necessarily rele-
vant to dispensations of treatment. PACKER, supra note 59, at 26.  Packer
explains:
[I]n the case of Punishment we are dealing with a person because he has
engaged in offending conduct; our concern is either to prevent the recur-
rence of such conduct, or to inflict what is thought to be deserved pain, or
to do both.  In the case of Treatment there is no necessary relation be-
tween conduct and Treatment; we deal with the person as we do because
we think he will be “better off” as a consequence.
Id.
66. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
67. “[T]reatment [or rehabilitation] [is] always subject to revision upon a showing
either: a. That an alternative response would be more beneficial to him or her, or
b. That his or her condition has altered so as no longer to require that, or any
other, further response.”  Wasserstrom, supra note 55, at 179.  “The idea of treat-
ment necessarily entails individual differentiation, indeterminacy, a rejection of
proportionality, and a disregard of normative valuations of the seriousness of be-
havior.”  Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 91.  In distinguishing
offense-oriented sentences (punitive) and offender-oriented ones (rehabilitative),
Professor Feld observes:
When based on the characteristics of the offense, the sentence usually is
determinate and proportional, with a goal of retribution or deterrence.
When based on the characteristics of the offender, however, the sentence
is typically indeterminate, with a goal of rehabilitation or incapacitation.
The theory that correctional administrators will release an offender only
when he is determined to be “rehabilitated” underlies indeterminate
sentencing.  When sentences are individualized, the offense is relevant
only for diagnosis.  Thus, it is useful to contrast offender-oriented dispo-
sitions, which are indeterminate and non-proportional, with offense-
based dispositions, which are determinate, proportional, and directly re-
lated to the past offense.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 847 (footnotes
omitted).
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clusive sanctions.68  However, some disagree, seeing punishment and
rehabilitation as compatible.69  In a sense, both camps are correct, de-
pending on the context in which they make their claims.
68. Professor Feld sees an “innate contradiction” in attempting to combine a “penal
social control” function with a rehabilitative “social welfare” function.  Feld, Abol-
ish The Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 93.  He explains:
Conceptually, punishment and treatment are mutually exclusive pe-
nal goals.  Both make markedly different assumptions about the sources
of criminal or delinquent behavior.  Punishment assumes that responsi-
ble, free-will moral actors make blameworthy choices and deserve to suf-
fer the prescribed consequences for their acts.  Punishment imposes
unpleasant consequences because of an offender’s past offenses.  By con-
trast, most forms of rehabilitative treatment . . . assume some degree of
determinism.  Whether grounded in psychological or sociological
processes, treatment assumes that certain antecedent factors cause the
individual’s undesirable conditions or behavior.  Treatment and therapy,
therefore, seek to alleviate undesirable conditions in order to improve
the offender’s future welfare.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 833 (footnotes
omitted).  Professor Federle observes that “the juvenile court fluctuates between
punishment and rehabilitation without attempting to reconcile these opposing
justifications” which are “two [irreconcilable] polar impulses.”  Katherine Hunt
Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of
Children’s Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 38 (1990).  H.L.A. Hart observes that
“[t]he ideals of Reform . . . (corrective training) . . . plainly run counter
to . . . [punitive] principles of Justice or proportion.”  Hart, supra note 54, at
25–26.  Professor Herbert Morris argues for a basic human right to be punished
for one’s criminal offenses in stark contrast to being subjected to coercive rehabil-
itation which disrespects human dignity. See generally Morris, supra note 57.  I
have related Morris’s views to juvenile justice. See Martin R. Gardner, The Right
of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: Some Implications of Treating Kids as Per-
sons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989).  C.S. Lewis has expressed views similar to Mor-
ris’s.  C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES. JUDICATAE
224 (1953).  Herbert Packer adds that punishment and rehabilitation are “always
distinguish[ed] . . . [by] the nature of the relationship between the offending con-
duct and what we do to the person who has engaged in it.” PACKER, supra note
59, at 26.  He explains:
For example, by saying that we may deal with a youth who seems likely
to fall into a life of crime either by locking him up or by providing him
with an education, we have not described the essential difference be-
tween Punishment and Treatment.  If we send him to a school pursuant
to a judgment that he has engaged in offending conduct, we are subject-
ing him to Punishment; if we think that he will be better off in jail than
on the streets and proceed to lock him up without a determination that
he has engaged in offending conduct, we are subjecting him to
Treatment.
Id.
69. In the context of discussing whether an order of probation was consistent with
the thesis that probation is meant to rehabilitate rather than punish, New Jersey
Chief Justice Weintraub said:
The argument assumes that punishment and rehabilitation are some-
how incompatible.  Of course they are not. . . .  Punishment and rehabili-
tation are not antagonists.
Probation assumes the offender can be rehabilitated without serving
the suspended jail sentence.  But this is not to say that probation is
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Those seeing compatibility make a valid point in claiming punish-
ment sometimes makes its recipient “better off.”70  For decades, adult
inmates have been sent to prisons and penitentiaries as punishment
for committing criminal offenses, but with hopes that they will also be
rehabilitated.71  While in practice these goals may well be fundamen-
tally at odds,72 there are certainly situations where individuals do
meant to be painless.  Probation has an inherent sting, and restrictions
upon the freedom of the probationer are realistically punitive in qual-
ity. . . .  Probation is meant to serve the overall public interest as well as
the good of the immediate offender.
In re Buehrer, 236 A.2d 592, 596–97 (N.J. 1967); see infra notes 70–73 and accom-
panying text.
70. See PACKER, supra note 59, at 26–27; infra note 74 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 36.  For example, the punishments defined by the Model Penal
Code are administered within a “general framework of a preventative scheme”
with “rehabilitation” as a “subsidiary” goal. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 explana-
tory note (Official Draft 1985).  The Federal Comprehensive Control Act of 1984
offers the following:
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.—The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion.  The court, in determining the particular sentence to be im-
posed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner; . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
Some claim that the introduction of the rehabilitative ideal into adult criminal
law theory meant that punishment, with its concerns for retribution and deter-
rence, had been totally abandoned in favor of a systematically rehabilitative and
preventative model. See Jerome Hall, Justice in the 20th Century, 59 CAL. L.
REV. 752, 753 (1971) (describing the widespread disillusionment with punish-
ment in the twentieth century with attendant disparagement of theories of deter-
rence and retribution and the emergence of rehabilitation as “the single rational
goal” of legal policy).
However, the emergence of the rehabilitative ideal never meant the total de-
mise of punishment.  Vestiges of retributivism remained in legislation embodying
the rehabilitative model.  Sentences were based on legislative proscriptions of
maximum penalties based on offenses and considerations of relative blamewor-
thiness. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 38 (1974).  The com-
mission of a criminal act as a necessary predicate for a sentence thus belied any
systematic rehabilitative model in favor of a “backward-looking,” desert-oriented
system of justice.
72. In a famous statement expressing skepticism regarding the effectiveness of reha-
bilitation within penal confinement, Judge Marvin Frankel said that “no one
should be sent to prison for rehabilitation.”  United States v. Bergman, 416 F.
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emerge from prison “rehabilitated,” at least partly as a consequence of
events or rehabilitation programs occurring within the prison.73
In the juvenile justice context one commentator made the following
observation:
[P]unishment and rehabilitation are theoretically compatible.  In recent
years, researchers have begun to suggest that some degree of punishment,
especially for serious offenders, is appropriate and compatible with the juve-
nile system’s child-centered philosophy. . . .  Plainly, the two are not mutually
exclusive goals: some types of “punishment” can serve to rehabilitate a young
offender.74
On the other hand, while rehabilitation may, in a sense, exist
alongside punishment within a punitive regime,75 the concepts of pun-
ishment and rehabilitation are mutually exclusive for purposes of as-
sessing constitutionally mandated procedural protections at trial.  If a
punitive disposition is possible upon a finding of guilt in a given pro-
ceeding, the proceeding is “criminal” and subject to Fifth and Sixth
Amendment requirements regardless of whether some rehabilitation
might be intended or even forthcoming.76  On the other hand, if the
Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  By the 1970s disillusionment with the rehabili-
tative ideal had become widespread. See Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of
Retribution: An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781, 782–83
[hereinafter Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution].
73. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
121, 132 (2005) (arguing that “properly conducted” programs of “risk manage-
ment” may effectuate offenders’ ability to change their antisocial behavior). But
see Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Re-
form, Spring 1974 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (arguing only in a “few and isolated”
situations do rehabilitative efforts in correctional institutions actually reduce
recidivism).
74. Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Rec-
onciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48
VAND. L. REV. 479, 506–07 (1995).
75. Similarly, punishment may occur within rehabilitative dispositions. See, e.g.,
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139–40 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding administer-
ing to hospitalized mental patient a drug, which induces vomiting as “aversive
stimuli,” for allegedly violating behavior rule of the institution, constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment unless the inmate consents to the use of the drug).
However, the Supreme Court has arguably ruled that Eighth Amendment reme-
dies are unavailable to involuntarily committed mental patients even if hospital
officials are “deliberately indifferent” to their medical and psychological needs.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312, 325 (1982) (holding lower court erred
in instructing jury on the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard in
case of patient’s allegations of unsafe conditions in hospital in which he was con-
fined).  The Court noted with approval the position of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals that the “Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual punish-
ment of those convicted of crimes, was not an appropriate source for determining
the rights of the involuntarily committed.” Id. at 312.
76. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.  Justice White summarized this
point in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury:
[T]he consequences of criminal guilt are so severe that the Constitution
mandates a jury to prevent abuses of official power by insuring, where
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possible consequences of a given proceeding are solely rehabilitative or
otherwise nonpunitive, the proceeding is a “civil” matter not subject to
Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements.  Professor Feld states the
matter clearly:
[M]any legislatures and courts fail to consider adequately whether a juvenile
justice system can explicitly punish without simultaneously providing crimi-
nal procedural safeguards such as a jury trial.  Although a legislature cer-
tainly may conclude that punishment is an appropriate goal and a legitimate
strategy for controlling young offenders, it must provide the procedural safe-
guards of the criminal law when it opts to shape behavior by punishment.
Any ancillary social benefit or individual reformation resulting from punish-
ment is irrelevant to the need for such procedural protections.77
C. The Emergence of Punitive Juvenile Justice
As mentioned earlier, the rehabilitative ideal influenced criminal
law sentencing policy for much of the twentieth century.78  That all
changed in the latter quarter of the century, however, when a “renais-
sance of retribution” suddenly emerged as theorists across the politi-
cal spectrum began to reject rehabilitation as a penal goal and defend
punishment as the means of giving offenders their just deserts and
deterring crime.79
demanded, community participation in imposing serious deprivations of
liberty and to provide a hedge against corrupt, biased, or political justice.
We have not, however, considered the juvenile case a criminal proceed-
ing within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and hence automati-
cally subject to all of the restrictions normally applicable in criminal
cases. . . .
The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have a will
and are responsible for their actions.  A finding of guilt establishes that
they have chosen to engage in conduct so reprehensible and injurious to
others that they must be punished to deter them and others from crime.
Guilty defendants are considered blameworthy; they are branded and
treated as such, however much the State also pursues rehabilitative
ends in the criminal justice system.
. . . .
. . . States are free . . . to embrace condemnation, punishment, and
deterrence as . . . desirable attributes of the juvenile justice system [so
long as they extend criminal court safeguards].
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551, 553 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
77. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 847; see also
PACKER, supra note 59, at 27 (opining that if the “ultimate aim” of a disposition is
punishment, the disposition is punitive even if as an “intermediate mode” we
hope for the betterment of the offender).
78. See supra notes 36, 70–73 and accompanying text.
79. See generally Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution, supra note 72.  Professor
Feld notes that in the 1970s determinate sentencing based on present offense and
prior record increasingly replaced indeterminate sentencing as “just deserts” and
retribution displaced rehabilitation as the underlying rational for criminal sen-
tencing.  Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 10, at 26 n.83.  By the mid-
1980s, about half the states enacted determinate sentencing laws, ten eliminated
parole boards, and many utilized guidelines to determine sentencing decisions.
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Not surprisingly, this new retributive orientation spilled over into
juvenile justice as policy makers adopted “get tough” policies on youth-
ful offenders in response to perceptions of rapidly increasing juvenile
crime rates.80  The policy manifested itself in several ways.  In the
mid-1990s, virtually all states enacted measures that facilitated waiv-
ing more and younger youths to criminal court for prosecution as
adults.81  More significantly for present purposes, “just deserts” con-
siderations emerged in juvenile justice as many jurisdictions enacted
determinate and mandatory minimum sentencing based on the of-
fense committed.82
Some states, such as Washington, enacted systems aimed explic-
itly at providing “punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and
criminal history of the juvenile offender”83 in order to, among other
things, “[m]ake the juvenile offender accountable for his or her crimi-
nal behavior.”84  Today, the Washington juvenile code embodies a pre-
Id.; see also Forst & Blomquist, supra note 10, at 335–47 (analyzing the shift in
the juvenile justice system away from rehabilitation towards punitive
dispositions).
80. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 10, at 25, 31.
81. Id. at 31, 34, 40.  Among the states, the enhanced waiver policy took three forms:
liberalizing the power of judges to make waiver decisions, legislative exclusion of
certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, and granting prosecutors discre-
tion to “directly file” certain cases in criminal court. Id. at 39. See generally
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
See also Forst & Blomquist, supra note 10, at 337–42 (discussing the various
waiver procedures used to waive juveniles into adult criminal court).
82. As of 1988, about one-third of the states had employed offense-based determinate
sentencing in one form or another.  Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punish-
ment, supra note 1, at 851; see also Gardner, supra note 1, at 132 (footnotes omit-
ted) (stating that “[p]rinciples of personal responsibility and accountability . . .
are now routinely coming to the forefront as offending minors are given their ‘just
deserts’ through punishment proportionate to the gravity of their offenses”).
83. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).  In passing
the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, Washington became the first state to enact a
systematic determinate sentencing statute for juvenile offenders.  Forst & Blom-
quist, supra note 10, at 343.  For a discussion of California’s enactment of a puni-
tive approach, see id. at 343–45, 347–49.
84. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).  In addition
to the provisions for punishment, the Washington Juvenile Justice Act provides:
(2)  It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having
primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the
needs of youthful offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established.  It
is the further intent of the legislature that youth, in turn, be held ac-
countable for their offenses and that communities, families, and the ju-
venile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent.  To
effectuate these policies, the legislature declares the following to be
equally important purposes of this chapter:
(a)  Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b)  Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have com-
mitted offenses as defined by this chapter;
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sumptive sentencing system in which dispositions are determined by
the youth’s age, the offense committed, and the history and serious-
ness of previous offenses.85  Clearly such provisions are not premised
on meeting the rehabilitative needs of the offender, but rather embody
an extensive sentencing system aimed at holding juveniles accounta-
ble in proportion to their culpability.86  Moreover, Washington pro-
ceedings are open to the public,87 contrary to the private proceedings
mandated in traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice,88 although
jury trials are excluded.89
Other states have also adopted offense-based criteria with substan-
tial sentences for the most serious crimes and proportionally shorter
sentences for less serious offenses.90  Some dictate mandatory mini-
mum terms of confinement based on the seriousness of the offense.91
Finally, some states retain indeterminate sentencing for convicted de-
linquents generally but mandate determinate dispositions for repeat
offenders or those committing certain serious offenses.92  Such juris-
dictions thus manifest pockets of punitive juvenile justice within oth-
erwise indeterminate and arguably rehabilitative systems.  Clearly,
the offense-oriented, determinate sentencing movement constitutes a
clear invocation of the punitive sanction,93 and stands in stark con-
. . . .
(f)  Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juve-
nile offenders;
(g)  Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities
whenever consistent with public safety;
(h)  Provide for restitution to victims of crime;
(i)  Develop effective standards and goals for the operation, funding,
and evaluation of all components of the juvenile justice system and
related services at the state and local levels;
(j)  Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders
shall receive punishment, treatment, or both, and to determine the
jurisdictional limitations of the courts, institutions, and community
services; [and]
. . . .
(l)  Encourage the parents, guardian, or custodian of the juvenile to
actively participate in the juvenile justice process.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
85. The Washington system is described in detail elsewhere. See Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 843, 852–55; Walkover, supra note
1, at 528–31.
86. Walkover, supra note 1, at 531.
87. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
88. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
89. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 843; see WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).  For criticism of the
jury trial denial, see the discussion of State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d 1250 (Wash.
2008), infra subsection IV.A.2.
90. See, e.g., Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 859–60.
91. Id. at 862–63.
92. Id. at 863–71.
93. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text.
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trast to the offender-oriented, indeterminate dispositional scheme re-
flected in traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice.94
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC TRIALS BY JURY AND
JUVENILE COURTS
This Part examines the Supreme Court’s consideration of the Sixth
Amendment applicability of public jury trial protections in juvenile
proceedings as compared to adult criminal courts.  While the Court
has said nothing specifically regarding the public trial right in juve-
nile cases, it has addressed the jury issue in McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania.  To appreciate the significance of McKeiver and to assess its
ongoing vitality, it is necessary to understand the path taken by the
Court before it reached the case.  Therefore, the discussion here begins
by reviewing the cases applying various procedural protections to ju-
venile courts and culminates with the Court’s denial of jury trial
rights in McKeiver.  I then contrast this denial with an examination of
the role of jury trials in criminal courts in an attempt to show that
continued denial of jury trials in the new era of punitive juvenile jus-
tice is unjustified.  A similar contrast is then offered in the context of
the right to a public trial.  Where juvenile systems have become puni-
tive, the Sixth Amendment, consistent with sound public policy, re-
quires jury determinations and public proceedings to the same extent
as in criminal trials.  In addition, I will argue that juveniles constitute
a unique class entitling them, unlike their adult counterparts, to
waive their rights to jury determinations and to public trials,
respectively.
A. Current Constitutional Protections in Delinquency
Adjudications
As mentioned earlier, in the mid-1960s95 the Supreme Court began
expressing disillusionment with the juvenile justice system’s ability to
deliver its promises of rehabilitation. The Court’s first significant
case, Kent v. United States,96 dealt with procedural issues at judicial
waiver proceedings.  The Court found that, as prerequisites to valid
waivers to criminal court, juveniles are entitled to hearings in which
their counsel have access to all social reports relevant to the court’s
decision, as well as a statement of reasons for any decision to waive
the case.97  In imposing these protections, the Court expressed serious
doubt about whether the promised quid pro quo benefits of rehabilita-
94. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
96. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  For a detailed discussion of Kent, see
Paulsen, supra note 28.
97. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
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tion justified the denial of procedural protections in traditional juve-
nile courts:98
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile
courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to
whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical pur-
pose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitu-
tional guaranties applicable to adults.  There is much evidence that some
juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at
least with respect to children charged with law violation.  There is evidence, in
fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.99
Kent set the stage for In re Gault,100 which constituted the Court’s
first major effort to relate constitutional principles101 to delinquency
adjudications.  The Court reviewed the constitutionality of fifteen-
year-old Gerald Gault’s commitment to the Arizona State Industrial
School for a period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday.102  The
commitment was the result of a delinquency adjudication conducted
without procedural formality,103 at which it was determined that Ger-
98. In addition to the waiver issues, the petitioner, Kent, raised numerous claims
about violations of rights he would possess if he were an adult.  In declining to
consider these claims, the Court nevertheless stated:
These contentions raise problems of substantial concern as to the con-
struction of and compliance with the Juvenile Court Act.  They also sug-
gest basic issues as to the justifiability of affording a juvenile less
protection than is accorded to adults suspected of criminal offenses, par-
ticularly where, as here, there is an absence of any indication that the
denial of rights available to adults was offset, mitigated or explained by
action of the Government, as parens patriae, evidencing the special solic-
itude for juveniles commanded by the Juvenile Court Act.
Id. at 551–52.
99. Id. at 555–56.
100. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
101. See supra note 98.
102. Gault, 387 U.S. at 7.
103. After a complaint by a neighbor that Gerald had made an obscene phone call,
Gault was taken into custody by police. Id. at 4.  The arresting officer initiated
the adjudication proceeding by filing a petition in juvenile court alleging only that
Gerald Gault was “under the age of eighteen years, and is in need of the protec-
tion of this Honorable Court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor.” Id. at
5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The petition alleged
no factual basis for the judicial action proposed and was never served on Gerald
or his parents. Id.  Gerald appeared without counsel at a hearing that was held
on the petition. Id. at 34.  The complaining neighbor did not attend and no record
of the proceedings was prepared. Id. at 5.  The juvenile judge questioned Gerald
about the neighbor’s complaint, as related to the judge by the arresting officer, to
whom Gault apparently had admitted making the obscene call. Id. at 6.  Six days
later, during a hearing at which Gault was again unrepresented by counsel, the
judge sentenced Gault to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minor-
ity [that is, until twenty-one], unless sooner discharged by due process of law.”
Id. at 7–8 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ald made an obscene phone call.  The Court held that juveniles who
risk incarceration in state correction facilities, if found to be delin-
quent, are constitutionally entitled to the following rights in their ad-
judication proceedings: notice of the charges; assistance of counsel;
rights of confrontation and cross-examination; and the protections of
the privilege against self-incrimination.104
As in Kent, the Gault Court found little evidence that the juvenile
justice system benignly dispensed rehabilitation to youthful offenders,
however lofty the motives of the original enactors.105  “Neither senti-
ment nor folklore” shut the Court’s eyes to the fact that the traditional
juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional limitations, does not
meet its rehabilitative promise.106  In fact, the Court saw the system
as little more than a mechanism for stigmatizing youths as “delin-
quents”—a label it deemed the virtual equivalent to that of “crimi-
nal”107—and restricting their liberty.108
104. Gault, 387 U.S. 1.  The Court chose not to rule on whether juvenile courts are
required to provide transcripts of their proceedings to appealing litigants or
whether juvenile proceedings are subject to appellate review. Id. at 57–58.
105. The Court noted that:
[T]he highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar
system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context.
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is—to
say the least—debatable.  And in practice, as we remarked in the Kent
case, the results have not been entirely satisfactory.
Id. at 17–18.
106. Id. at 18, 21–22.
107. The Court noted that:
[Supposedly,] one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court
procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a “criminal.”
The juvenile offender is now classed as a “delinquent.” . . . [T]his term
has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term “criminal”
applied to adults.
Id. at 23–24 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 27.  The Court noted:
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juve-
nile Court process with which we deal in this case.  A boy is charged with
misconduct.  The boy is committed to an institution where he may be
restrained of liberty for years.  It is of no constitutional consequence—
and of limited practical meaning—that the institution to which he is
committed is called an Industrial School.  The fact of the matter is that,
however euphemistic the title, a “receiving home” or an “industrial
school” for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.  His world becomes “a building
with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional
hours . . . .”  Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and
friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and “delinquents” confined with him for anything from way-
wardness to rape and homicide.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Holmes, 109 A.2d
523, 530 (Pa. 1954)).
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The Court did not expressly see this loss of liberty as “punitive,”
although it did suggest that the effects of juvenile dispositions are
often indistinguishable from those experienced by convicted
criminals.109  The Court put the matter this way: “A proceeding where
the issue is whether the child will be found to be ‘delinquent’ and sub-
jected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to
a felony prosecution.”110
Although the rights to notice, confrontation, and counsel recog-
nized in Gault are all spelled out in the Sixth Amendment,111 the
Court instead appealed to principles of due process and fair treatment
under the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for requiring those
rights in juvenile proceedings.112  In avoiding an express finding that
juvenile dispositions are punitive, thus rendering delinquency adjudi-
cations “criminal prosecutions” under the Sixth Amendment,113 the
more flexible due process approach allowed the Court to impose the
procedural protections114 without saddling the juvenile system with
the full array of constitutional requirements applicable to criminal
cases.115  Specifically, the flexibility of the due process approach in
109. See supra note 108.
110. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
111. See supra note 39.
112. Gault, 387 U.S. at 26–27.  However, when addressing the applicability of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the Gault Court found juvenile proceedings
to be “criminal cases” under the Fifth Amendment, thus requiring application of
the privilege in delinquency adjudications. Id. at 47–49.  This finding of “crimi-
nal cases” did not mean, however, that the Court had necessarily found the dispo-
sition in Gault itself to have been punitive.  The Court observed that the
availability of the privilege turns not on the type of proceeding in which its pro-
tection is invoked but upon “the nature of the statement . . . and the exposure
which it invites.” Id. at 49.  Because statements by juveniles invite exposure to
commitment to state institutions similar to prisons as well as exposure to actual
criminal court through various waiver mechanisms, see supra notes 34–35 and
accompanying text, the Court found the privilege applicable to the juvenile jus-
tice system. Id. at 49–52.
In a separate Gault opinion, Justice Black appealed directly to the Sixth
Amendment as the basis for the notice, confrontation, and counsel rights, as well
as to the Fifth Amendment as the basis for the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 59–61 (Black, J., concurring).
113. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
114. In discussing the demands of due process, the Court noted: “[I]t would be ex-
traordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the
exercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’  Under our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.” Gault, 387 U.S. at
27–28.
115. Id. at 30.  The Court expressed some reluctance to completely criminalize the
juvenile system.  Indeed, it opined that the protections it imposed would not de-
tract from the rehabilitative mission—to the extent that it meaningfully ex-
isted—of juvenile courts. See id. at 21.  In fact, the Court suggested that the
protections might even promote rehabilitation:
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 29
Gault would later allow the denial of jury trial rights in McKeiver,116 a
result which would have been difficult, if not impossible, had the
Gault Court found that delinquency adjudications were punitive and
thus governed by the Sixth Amendment.
Three years after Gault, in In re Winship,117 the Court considered
whether the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, theretofore
limited to criminal proceedings, is constitutionally required in delin-
quency adjudications.  The Court held that juveniles charged in delin-
quency proceedings with acts that would be crimes if committed by
adults are entitled as a matter of due process to the reasonable doubt
standard of proof.118  The Court noted that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard is constitutionally required in adult criminal cases to minimize
the risks of subjecting innocent persons to the stigma and loss of lib-
erty inherent in criminal conviction and punishment.119  Similar risks
required that the same standard apply in delinquency proceedings be-
cause “[judicial] intervention cannot take the form of subjecting the
child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to
the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to con-
vict him were he an adult.”120  As in Gault, the Winship Court avoided
any explicit finding that the juvenile process was punitive and, there-
fore, governed by all the procedural protections unique to the criminal
system.  Instead, the Court focused on two aspects of juvenile disposi-
tions—the potential for stigma and the potential for severely restrict-
Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceed-
ings in the court.  The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding
was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of
the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and
admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise
institutions of the State provided guidance and help “to save him from a
downward career.”  Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admira-
bly prevalent.  But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, en-
tered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception.  They
suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, imparti-
ality and orderliness—in short, the essentials of due process—may be a
more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is
concerned.
Id. at 25–26 (footnote omitted) (quoting Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909)).
In a partial dissent, Justice Harlan disagreed, believing the application of con-
frontation rights and the privilege against self-incrimination would frustrate re-
habilitative goals. Id. at 74–78 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116. See infra subsection III.A.1.
117. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
118. See id. at 368.
119. Id. at 363.
120. Id. at 367 (footnote omitted).
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ing liberty—as the reasons for requiring the reasonable doubt
standard.121
Kent, Gualt, and Winship thus paint a picture of a failed or failing
juvenile justice system that subjects young people to confinement in
secure institutions in the name of rehabilitation but with little pros-
pect of it actually occurring.  It is against this backdrop that McKeiver
made its entrance.
1. McKeiver
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,122 the Court held that juveniles are
not entitled to jury trials in delinquency proceedings even though ad-
judication could result in the same impositions of stigma and loss of
liberty at issue in Gault and Winship.123  Noting that neither Gault
nor Winship compelled the conclusion that delinquency proceedings
are “criminal prosecutions” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial,124 a plurality of the Court125 concluded that due
process considerations of fundamental fairness were not offended by
denying jury trials at delinquency adjudications.126  Unlike the pro-
tections recognized in Gault and Winship, which enhance accurate
121. Outside the juvenile court context, the Court has held that some proceedings po-
tentially resulting in stigmatic labeling and significant losses of liberty need not
be governed by the reasonable doubt standard.  Thus, in Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979), the Court rejected the argument, based on Winship, that the loss
of liberty and the stigma that occurred through involuntary hospitalization of the
mentally ill constituted sufficient grounds for requiring the reasonable doubt
standard in civil commitment proceedings.  Acknowledging that significant
stigma and loss of liberty are inherent in mental health commitments, id. at
425–26, the Addington Court nevertheless distinguished the civil commitment
process from the procedures in Winship.  Unlike the juvenile system, which im-
poses its stigma and restriction of liberty upon offenders because of their past
offenses, the civil commitment process focuses on the present status of the defen-
dant and attempts to determine his present dangerousness and need for confine-
ment and therapy. Id. at 428–29.  Therefore, the central issue in Winship was “a
straight forward factual question—did the accused commit the act alleged”—but
in Addington the Court grappled with an evaluation of the patient’s mental
health, a difficult subjective judgment of an inherently doubtful nature. Id. at
429–30.  The Court concluded that the reasonable doubt standard would frus-
trate the purposes of commitment proceedings and, therefore, was not required.
Id. at 429–30, 432.
122. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
123. See id. at 545. McKeiver dealt with several consolidated cases concerning a vari-
ety of criminal conduct ranging from robbery and assault to willfully impeding
traffic and making riotous noise.  Id. at 534–36.
124. “[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a ‘criminal prosecu-
tion,’ within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 541.
125. Justices Blackmun, Stewart, White, and Chief Justice Burger comprised the plu-
rality. Id. at 530.  Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment and filed a separate
opinion. Id. at 557.  Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.
at 553.  Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall dissented. Id. at 557.
126. See id. at 543.
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fact-finding, the plurality found that juries are not necessary to
achieve that accuracy.127  Furthermore, the Court felt imposing juries
in juvenile cases might actually be counterproductive: “If the jury trial
were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right,
it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the for-
mality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the pub-
lic trial.”128  Were such consequences to befall the juvenile courts,
“there [would be] little need for [their] separate existence.”129
In sharp contrast to the skeptical and gloomy picture of the juve-
nile system painted by the Court in its earlier cases, the McKeiver plu-
rality was “reluctant to say that, despite disappointments of grave
dimensions, it still does not hold promise.”130  Indeed, with more com-
mitment and resources, the various states may yet make their sys-
tems work if left to their own devices.131
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black
and Marshall,132 argued that:
[W]here a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for
a criminal act and to order “confinement” until the child reaches 21 years of
age or where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect,
then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult.133
127. Id.  Specifically, the plurality observed that “one cannot say that in our legal sys-
tem the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.” Id.
128. Id. at 550.
129. Id. at 551.
130. Id. at 547.
131. The plurality observed:
So much depends on the availability of resources, on the interest and
commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on understanding
as to cause and effect and cure.  In this field, as in so many others, one
perhaps learns best by doing.  We are reluctant to disallow the States to
experiment further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive
answers to the problems of the young, and we feel that we would be im-
peding that experimentation by imposing the jury trial.  The States, in-
deed, must go forward.  If, in its wisdom, any State feels the jury trial is
desirable in all cases, or in certain kinds, there appears to be no impedi-
ment to its installing a system embracing that feature.  That, however,
is the State’s privilege and not its obligation.
Id.
132. Id. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 559.  Justice Douglas elaborated:
In the present cases imprisonment or confinement up to 10 years was
possible for one child and each faced at least a possible five-year incar-
ceration.  No adult could be denied a jury trial in those circum-
stances. . . .  The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes trial by jury
provided in the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States, speaks of de-
nial of rights to “any person,” not denial of rights to “any adult person”;
and we have held indeed that where a juvenile is charged with an act
that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he is entitled to
be tried under a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 560.
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These same procedural protections include a trial by jury.134  Speak-
ing to the plurality’s fears that jury trials would introduce undesirable
delay, formality, and openness to the juvenile system, the dissent ref-
erenced a lower court opinion addressing such concerns.135  Regarding
delay, the lower court found “that there is no meaningful evidence
that granting the right to jury trials will impair the function of the
court”136 given that “few juries have been demanded” in states that
permit jury trials in juvenile court.137  Moreover, delay may be a good
thing: “By granting the juvenile the right to a jury trial, we would, in
fact, be protecting the accused from the judge who is under pressure to
move the cases, the judge with too many cases and not enough
time.”138
A supposed virtue of excluding juries from juvenile proceedings is
that the proceedings can thereby be private and informal, thus reduc-
ing the trauma experienced by the accused juvenile.139  However, the
“fact is that the procedures which are now followed in juvenile cases
are far more traumatic than the potential experience of a jury
trial.”140  Moreover, a jury trial removes the possible prejudice raised
when the same juvenile court judge makes waiver decisions on the
basis of evidence inadmissible at adjudication and then acts as the
fact-finder at adjudication having had access to such evidence.141
134. Id. at 561.
135. Id. at 561–62.
136. Id. app. at 564.
137. Id.  But see Andrew Treaster, Juveniles in Kansas Have a Constitutional Right to
a Jury Trial.  Now What?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1275, 1293 (2009) (showing many
juveniles requested jury trials shortly after jury trial rights were recognized).
138. McKeiver, 403 U.S. app. at 565 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
140. McKeiver, 403 U.S. app. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas
explained:
The fact that a juvenile realizes that his case will be decided by twelve
objective citizens would allow the court to retain its meaningfulness
without causing any more trauma than a trial before a judge who per-
haps has heard other cases involving the same juvenile in the past and
may be influenced by those prior contacts.  To agree that a jury trial
would expose a juvenile to a traumatic experience is to lose sight of the
real traumatic experience of incarceration without due process.  The real
traumatic experience is the feeling of being deprived of basic rights.
Id. app. at 563–64.
141. Justice Douglas noted:
A judge who receives facts of a case from the police and approves the
filing of a petition based upon those facts may be placed in the untenable
position of hearing a charge which he has approved.  His duty is to adju-
dicate on the evidence introduced at the hearing and not be involved in
any pre-adjudicatory investigation.
Id. app. at 564.  Similarly, a jury trial “will provide a safeguard against the judge
who may be prejudiced against a minority group or who may be prejudiced
against the juvenile brought before him because of some past occurrence which
was heard by the same judge.” Id. app. at 565.
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Finally, for Justice Douglas, the concern that jury trials would in-
troduce undesirable openness to juvenile proceedings was minimized
if not eliminated by interests that support public trials.  He cited such
benefits of public trials as alerting witnesses unknown to the parties;
educating the public about the legal system; and restraining the possi-
ble abuse of judicial power through contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion.142
2. The Supreme Court and Punitive Juvenile Justice
It is important to note that all of the Court’s delinquency adjudica-
tion cases143 were decided prior to the explicit movement towards pu-
nitive juvenile justice, which began in earnest in the late 1970s.144
Thus, the Court heard its cases at a time when the rehabilitative ideal
142. Id. app. at 567.  In fact, juvenile proceedings are never totally secret.  Witnesses
are present, parents and relatives routinely attend, and an array of social work-
ers, court reporters, students, police trainees, probation counselors, and law en-
forcement officers are also often in attendance. Id.
143. In addition to the Gault, Winship, and McKeiver cases discussed above, the Court
decided another significant case assessing constitutional aspects of delinquency
adjudications.  In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court unanimously
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the trial
of juveniles as adults if they have previously been subjected to a delinquency
hearing on the same charge.  Jeopardy describes “the risk that is traditionally
associated with a criminal prosecution.” Id. at 528.  Indeed, “the risk to which
the term jeopardy refers is that traditionally associated with ‘actions intended to
authorize criminal punishment.’” Id. at 529 (quoting United States ex rel. Mar-
cus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1943)).
In assessing delinquency adjudications in terms of such risks, the Court
stated:
[I]t is simply too late in the day to conclude . . . that a juvenile is not put
in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has
committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential conse-
quences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and
the deprivation of liberty for many years.
Id.
Therefore, “in terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an
adjudicatory hearing such as was held in this case from a traditional criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 530.  Both proceedings are designed “to vindicate [the] very
vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.” Id. at 531 (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The Breed Court concluded, therefore, that the juvenile respon-
dent was placed in jeopardy at the delinquency adjudication. Id. at 531.
Unlike the McKeiver Court’s views on the negative effects of jury trials on the
ability of the juvenile system to rehabilitate youthful offenders, the Breed Court
found that imposing double jeopardy protections would not frustrate whatever
rehabilitative potential the system possessed. See id. at 535–37.
144. See supra subsection II.C.  One commentator has noted that the McKeiver Court’s
“perspective of a benevolent, non-adversary juvenile court was not far off the
mark in 1971” but “[t]he same cannot be said 25 years after Gault” in light of the
“widely recognized” fact that juvenile courts have become increasingly punitive.
Sanborn, supra note 12, at 231.
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was still the universal underpinning of juvenile justice.  That the
Court found the system wanting in Kent, Gault, and Winship meant
only that it questioned whether the system delivered on its quid pro
quo rehabilitative promises and not that it had explicitly found the
system to be punitive.  In fact, the Court has never directly confronted
the question of whether the juvenile system punishes, and if so, what
constitutional consequences flow therefrom.145  That the lower courts
have insufficiently addressed such questions,146 however, argues for
Supreme Court clarification of the matter.
With the imposition of punitive dispositions, juvenile proceedings
become “criminal prosecutions” entitling the accused to a public trial
by an impartial jury.147  Although closely related and sharing under-
lying interests to some degree, the public trial and jury trial rights are
distinct.  A proceeding imposing the risk of any punishment is seem-
ingly a criminal prosecution for purposes of the public trial provi-
sion,148 while only actions charging “serious crimes” trigger the jury
trial right.149  Because of its priority in the Sixth Amendment text150
and its broader scope, the public trial right will be discussed herein
prior to its companion jury trial right.
B. Public Trials in Criminal Court
Because the Sixth Amendment rights to a public trial and a jury
determination are closely associated,151 recognizing a right to trial by
jury in juvenile proceedings would likely entail a corresponding recog-
nition of the public trial right.152  The public trial right reflects “the
145. The Court came close to a direct finding of punishment within the juvenile sys-
tem in Breed, see supra note 143, and in Gault’s conclusion that delinquency pro-
ceedings are “criminal cases” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).  However, such a
conclusion did not necessarily commit the Court to the view that juvenile disposi-
tions are punitive. See supra note 112.
146. See infra subsection IV.A.
147. See supra notes 37–44, 76–77 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 152.
149. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 39.
151. The public trial guaranty is “an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury
trial.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) (holding that requiring defendant to
testify in secret before a one-man grand jury who subsequently sentenced defen-
dant to jail for contempt violated defendant’s right to a public trial).
152. One commentator has noted:
[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury trials since
the presence of a jury . . . already insured the presence of a large part of
the public.  We need scarcely be reminded that the jury was the patria,
the “country” and that it was in that capacity and not as judges, that it
was summoned.
Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 388 (1932).  For a
critical view of the public trial right arguing that there is “no more reason for the
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traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials”153 by safeguard-
ing against “attempt[s] to employ our courts as instruments of perse-
cution” through the “knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion.”154  These in-
terests clearly overlap with some of those underlying the right to jury
trial.155
The Supreme Court has held that the right to a public trial is not
absolute.156  While closure is constitutionally permissible under some
circumstances,157 the Court has not recognized a right to a private
trial158 even though the right to a public trial has been held to apply
public trial as it is currently conceived than there is for a public execution,” see
id. at 397.
The Supreme Court has observed that “historically and functionally, open tri-
als have been closely associated with the development of the fundamental proce-
dure of trial by jury.”  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589
(1980) (holding that absent overriding interests criminal trials must be open to
the public).  The McKeiver Court noted the “possibility” of the public trial being
brought into the juvenile court system if jury trials were injected into the system.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).  If juvenile proceedings were
deemed “criminal prosecutions” for Sixth Amendment purposes, the public trial
right would be more extensive than the jury trial protection, which is triggered
only when the charged offense is punishable by imprisonment for six months or
longer. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.  In Oliver, the public trial
provision was mandated in a situation where the defendant was sentenced to jail
for sixty days or until such time as he complied with the court’s order to answer
questions. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 260.  It would thus appear that the threat of any
punishment triggers the public trial right.  Moreover, the public trial right ap-
plies not simply to the trial phase of the process, including the empanelling of the
jury, but also to pretrial proceedings that bear a resemblance to a trial such as
suppression hearings. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1133 (5th
ed. 2009).
153. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268.
154. Id. at 270; see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
155. See infra section III.C. Compare Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (noting
that the public trial right “ensur[es] that judge and prosecutor carry out their
duties responsibly”), with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting
the jury trial interest in checking “overzealous prosecutor[s] and compliant, bi-
ased, or eccentric judge[s]”).
156. “[T]he Court has made clear that the right to an open trial may give way to
other . . . interests.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.
157. See Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272 (suggesting in dicta that a trial with only the ac-
cused’s relatives, friends, and counsel present would constitute a public trial).
158. Citing the Court’s observation that “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right
does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that
right,” Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1965), the Court observed in
dicta that “while the Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant in a criminal
case the right to a public trial, it does not guarantee the right to compel a private
trial.”  Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979) (holding no right of the
press to attend pretrial suppression hearings).
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to the defendant and not to the public.159  Trials may be closed if the
party seeking closure advances “an overriding interest that is likely to
be prejudiced” if the trial is open.160
Moreover, a separate First Amendment right protects the interests
of the public and the press in attending trials.161  Similar to its treat-
ment of public trials under the Sixth Amendment, the Court has rec-
ognized that public and press rights may be overridden if
“necessitated by a compelling . . . interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.”162
While some interests protected by the First Amendment right of
access overlap some of those protected by the Sixth Amendment,163
the First Amendment cases recognize the additional interest of edu-
cating the public to the workings of the criminal justice system,
thereby enhancing responsible participation in a republican form of
government.164  The Court summarized these interests this way: “[T]o
the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to
criminal trials, it is to ensure that [the public communication on gov-
ernmental matters] is an informed one.”165
C. Jury Trials in Criminal Court
The right to a trial by jury has longstanding roots in Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence.  At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, jury
trials in criminal cases had been the accepted practice in England for
several centuries166 and were deemed essential aspects of fair pro-
159. The Court has noted that its “cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial
guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.” Gannett, 443 U.S. at
380.
160. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (holding that closure of a suppression hearing violated
defendant’s public trial guarantee).  In addition, “the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that [overriding] interest, [and] the court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding and . . . make findings adequate
to support the closure.” Id.
161. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that
absent overriding interests criminal trials must be open to the press and public).
162. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (holding that a
state statute mandating closure of courtroom during testimony of child victim of
sexual abuse violated the public’s right to attend criminal trials).
163. Compare id. at 606 (noting that public access to criminal trials “serve[s] as a
check upon the judicial process”), with Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)
(noting that juries act as a check on “overzealous prosecutors” and “biased
judges”).
164. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–05.
165. Id.
166. Some see the origin of the jury trial as early as the year 997 A.D. THEODORE F. T.
PLUCKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 108 (1956).  Others see Arti-
cle 39 of the Magna Carta as an embodiment of the right to jury trial.  Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 n.16 (1968); see MAGNA CARTA, art. XXXIX (1215)
(“[N]o free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped of his rights or posses-
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ceedings by the American colonists.167  The constitutions of all the
original states and every new state thereafter guaranteed trial by
jury.168  Furthermore, in addition to the Sixth Amendment,169 the
United States Constitution from the outset commanded jury trials for
“all Crimes” except “Cases of Impeachment.”170  Indeed, denials of
trial by jury were among the grievances expressed in the Declaration
of Independence.171  Referring to jury trials as a “great privilege,” the
Supreme Court in an early case observed that “[t]hose who emigrated
to this country from England brought with them [jury trials] ‘as their
birthright and inheritance, as part of that admirable common law
which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side
against the approaches of arbitrary power.’”172
In holding that trial by jury is a “fundamental right” and thus ap-
plicable to the states, the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana173
further explained the role of the jury as a check on arbitrary power:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.  If the defendant preferred
the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.  Beyond this, the
jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a funda-
mental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust
plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group
of judges.  Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Gov-
ernments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insis-
tence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence.174
The Duncan Court addressed the common criticism that jurors as
untrained laymen are incapable of understanding evidence or deter-
mining issues of fact by citing an authoritative study175 which con-
sions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way . . . ex-
cept by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”).
167. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 152, at 1068–69.
168. Id. at 1069.
169. See supra note 39.
170. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
171. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 152, at 1069.
172. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1898) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1779 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1891)).
173. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
174. Id. at 156.  Later, the Court observed:
[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppres-
sion by the Government; the jury interposes between the accused and his
accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a
judge or panel of judges, but who at the same time are less likely to
function or appear as but another arm of the Government that has pro-
ceeded against him.
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
175. HARRY KALVIN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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cluded that juries understand the evidence and come to sound
conclusions in most cases.176  The study further found that when ju-
ries differ from judges in reaching results, the difference is usually
because the jurors are serving some of the very purposes for which
they are meant to serve.177
Even though the text of the Sixth Amendment refers to “all crimi-
nal prosecutions,”178 the Supreme Court held in Baldwin v. New
York179 that the jury trial right applies only for accusations of “serious
crimes,” specifically only those “where imprisonment for more than six
months is authorized.”180  Although it recognized that the prospects of
imprisonment for less than six months will usually be traumatizing,
the Court nevertheless thought that “[w]here the accused cannot pos-
sibly face more than six months’ imprisonment . . . [such trauma], on-
erous though [it] may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that
result from speedy and inexpensive non-jury adjudications.”181
In addition to specifying when Sixth Amendment jury trials are
required, the Court has also addressed whether there exists a corre-
sponding right to insist on a bench trial.  In Singer v. United States,182
the Court held that while the right to trial by jury may be waived,183 a
possessor of the right has no additional right to waive a jury and ob-
tain a bench trial.184  In concluding that there exists “no constitu-
tional impediment to conditioning a waiver of [the] right on the
consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge,”185 the Court
found that if either of those parties does not consent to a waiver, “the
result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by
jury—the very thing that the Constitution guarantees him.”186
176. Id. at 4 n.2; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157.
177. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157 (citing KALVIN & ZEISEL, supra note 175, at 4 n.2).
178. See supra note 39.
179. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
180. Id. at 68–69.
181. Id. at 73.
182. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
183. “[A] jury trial [is] a right which the accused might ‘forego at his election.’” Id. at
33 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930)).
184. Id. at 36.  The Court observed that “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right
does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that
right.” Id. at 34–35.
185. Id. at 36.
186. Id.  The Court explained:
The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method
of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate
interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is war-
ranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as
most likely to produce a fair result.
Id.
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The Singer Court based its conclusions on the fact that, histori-
cally, jury determinations were deemed essential to fair trials187 and
that there was “no evidence” that the common law recognized the de-
fendant’s right to choose between bench and jury trial.188  Neverthe-
less, while denying a right to a bench trial in Singer, the Court left
open the possibility that such a right might be recognized in the
future:
We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circum-
stances where a defendant’s reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone
are so compelling that the Government’s insistence on trial by jury would re-
sult in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.  Petitioner argues that
there might arise situations where “passion, prejudice . . . public feeling” or
some other factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by
jury. . . .  [T]his is not such a case . . . .189
D. A Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial by Jury Trial
in Punitive Juvenile Justice
Prior to the advent of juvenile courts, juveniles were routinely sub-
jected to open proceedings with jury determinations when they faced
the threat of punishment in criminal proceedings.190  In today’s juve-
nile system, if a given jurisdiction brings a delinquency action and
subjects the accused juvenile to the possibility of punishment, the pro-
ceeding is a “criminal prosecution” triggering the right to a public
trial.191  If the accused risks the possibility of punitive incarceration
in excess of six months, it follows from Duncan and Baldwin that he or
she is also entitled to a jury trial.192  Such conclusions are not incon-
sistent with McKeiver, which premised its denial of the right to trial
by jury on assumptions of a rehabilitative model of juvenile justice
without addressing whether juvenile court dispositions were in fact
punitive.193
187. “Soon after the thirteenth Century trial by jury had become the principal institu-
tion for criminal cases.” Id. at 27.  Trials could not occur unless defendants con-
sented to such. Id. Sometimes they “were tortured until death or until they
‘consented’ to a jury trial.” Id.  “[D]efendants who refused to submit to a jury
were not entitled to an alternative method of trial.” Id.  Eventually, Parliament
enacted provisions that abolished torturing defendants to consent to jury trial
and instead dictated that “defendant[s] who stood mute when charged with a fel-
ony [were] deemed to have pleaded guilty.” Id.  Finally, statutes were enacted
permitting trials for those standing mute but requiring jury trials without the
necessity of the defendant’s formal consent. Id.
188. Id. at 26.
189. Id. at 37–38 (footnote omitted).
190. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ch. 2(1); supra notes 15–18 and ac-
companying text.
191. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also supra note 152 (discussing In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
192. See supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text.
193. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1976).
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In addition to being constitutionally required when serious puni-
tive dispositions are at stake, public jury trials in juvenile courts make
sense on policy grounds, as will be shown.  Should public jury trials be
considered undesirable in particular cases, however, I will argue that
any such objections can be rectified by entitling accused juveniles to
choose bench trials in which their identity is kept confidential.  The
following discussion will proceed first by considering the jury trial is-
sue and then the right to a public proceeding.
1. Jury Trials in Juvenile Court
a. Policy Considerations
Justice Douglas’s dissent in McKeiver addressed some policy con-
cerns implicated in utilizing jury determinations in delinquency adju-
dications.194  Adding to that discussion, several other points should be
noted. Duncan recognized that juries protect against weak or biased
judges, inject the community’s values into the law, and increase the
visibility and accountability of the legal process.195  These protective
functions are arguably of even greater importance in delinquency ad-
judications, which are typically conducted outside public view.196
Moreover, despite the McKeiver plurality’s claims that juries are
not necessary for accurate fact-finding,197 it does appear that juries
are often advantageous to an accused.  Judges are far more likely to
convict than juries.198  In fact, the “case law suggests that judges often
convict on evidence so scant that only the most closed-minded or mis-
194. McKeiver, 403 U.S. app. at 563–67 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see supra notes
135–42 and accompanying text.
195. “In Duncan, the Supreme Court emphasized that the purposes of the jury trial
were to check against arbitrary actions by the government, to safeguard against
the overzealous prosecutor and the biased judge, and to assure fair trials.  Jury
trials are necessary in juvenile court for the same reasons.”  Sanborn, supra note
12, at 236 (footnote omitted); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
196. Feld, supra note 1, at 88.  Increasing the visibility of juvenile proceedings is espe-
cially important in light of the fact that problems occurring therein are not easily
corrected on appeal due to the fact that juvenile courts generally possess jurisdic-
tion only during the defendant’s minority, often making cases moot before appeal
can be effectuated.  As one court put it:
Delinquency proceedings as much as adult criminal prosecutions can be
used as instruments of persecution, and may be subject to judicial abuse.
The appellate process is not a sufficient check on juvenile courts, for
problems of mootness and the cost of prosecuting an appeal screen most
of what goes on from appellate court scrutiny.  We cannot help but notice
that the children’s cases appealed to this court have often shown much
more extensive and fundamental error than is generally found in adult
criminal cases, and wonder whether secrecy is not fostering a judicial
attitude of casualness toward the law in children’s proceedings.
R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971) (footnote omitted).
197. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543; see supra note 127.
198. Ainsworth, Youth Justice, supra note 12, at 942.
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guided juror could think the evidence satisfied the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”199  A variety of explanations have been
offered for this phenomenon, including judicial access to prejudicial
information unknown to juries,200 individual “tough on crime” judicial
biases,201 and judicial use of conviction as a means to provide con-
victed youths rehabilitative services as conditions of probation or as
incidents of institutional confinement.202
Jury trials are additionally advantageous to juvenile defendants
because they enhance meaningful appellate review and the corre-
sponding correction of legal error occurring at adjudication.  In jury
trials, judges must articulate the law governing the case in instructing
the jury.203  Such instructions are subject to later appellate review
and correction if necessary.204  In bench trials without such instruc-
tions, “prejudicial errors of law can easily go undetected because they
are not articulated.”205  Therefore, “juveniles denied a jury trial lose
out . . . [because they] are unlikely to be able to prove an error of law
which would allow them to prevail on appeal.”206
Finally, the group dynamics inherent in jury decision-making in-
crease the likelihood that witness credibility will be assessed and facts
correctly found.207  Among other advantages, the group decision-mak-
ing entailed in jury deliberations provides “the give-and-take of a dis-
cussion format [which] promotes accuracy and good judgment by
ensuring that competing viewpoints are aired and vetted.”208  Such
considerations lead to the conclusion that the McKeiver Court errone-
ously assumed defendants in delinquency adjudications do not suffer
199. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 12, at 564.
200. As one commentator observed:
Juries would not have access to the youths’ records, would not know de-
fendants from previous offenses or stages in the court process, and would
not realize which juveniles had been held in detention.  Juries would not
be exposed to prejudicial, inadmissible evidence that frequently surfaces
at preliminary, detention, or certification hearings.  Juries also would
not know which prosecutors were from special units that deal only with
offenders who have prior records.
Sanborn, supra note 12, at 236; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 12, at
571–75 (discussing case-related factors that lead to distorting influences in bench
trials).
201. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 12, at 569–70.
202. Id. at 570.  As Professor Ainsworth notes: “[T]rial by jury was eliminated in most
juvenile courts as irrelevant to the proper determination before the court, be-
cause the court was less concerned with factually determining whether the child
had broken the law than with sensitively diagnosing and treating the child’s so-
cial pathology.”  Ainsworth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts, supra note 12, at 1101.
203. Ainsworth, Youth Justice, supra note 12, at 942.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Ainsworth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts, supra note 12, at 1126.
207. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 12, at 576–82.
208. Id. at 578–79.
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any diminution in the quality of their adjudications as a result of be-
ing denied the right to a jury.209
The dissent in McKeiver addressed concerns about whether jury
trials would impose significant costs, thereby inhibiting the effective-
ness of juvenile courts.210  However convincing that argument, it is
important to keep in mind that the jury trial costs of delay and formal-
ity cited by the McKeiver plurality211 are of concern only within a re-
habilitative model of juvenile justice.212  If the system has become
punitive, thus necessitating jury trials, the benefits of jury determina-
tions213 replace whatever costs such trials might have imposed on a
rehabilitative model.214
b. Waiver of Jury Trial Right: A Juvenile Right to a Bench
Trial?
As made clear by the discussion above, jury trials have long been
deemed vital to fair trials.215  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
recognized that jury trial waivers are permissible.216  Thus, a consti-
tutional requirement of jury trials in juvenile cases would mean that,
as is the case of waivers of counsel or indeed of all trial rights them-
selves,217 defendants in delinquency adjudications would be allowed
to express their wishes and forego a jury in favor of a bench trial.  Not-
withstanding the considerable benefits entailed in jury determina-
tions, a variety of factors unique to young people support allowing
209. Id. at 579; see also Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 12, at 1161–69 (dis-
cussing advantages of jury trials over bench trials).
210. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, app. 564–65 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
211. Id. at 550 (plurality opinion); see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text; see also Feld, Constitutional Ten-
sion, supra note 12, at 1143–52 (providing a critical analysis of McKeiver).
213. See supra notes 194–209 and accompanying text.
214. “Although the Court’s public policy considerations may have been relevant in
1971, they are now inapposite because of the growing similarity between juvenile
and criminal codes as well as the changing nature of juvenile proceedings.”
Rixey, supra note 12, at 886. But see Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 12,
at 1159–61 (discussing possible dangers in advocating jury trials for delinquents
including increased severity in sentences and perverse incentives to plea
bargain).
215. See supra notes 166–74 and accompanying text.
216. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (holding waiver of jury trial
permissible in federal criminal trials).
217. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, app. 569–70 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing ability of juveniles to waive counsel and rights to trial by
pleading guilty); Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 27, at 217
(“[S]tates use the adult waiver standard—‘knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’
under the totality of the circumstances—to gauge juveniles’ waivers of rights in-
cluding the right to counsel.”).
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them a right to choose a bench trial in lieu of a jury despite the Court’s
denial of such a right in Singer.218
It must be noted that most jurisdictions employing punitive dispo-
sitions also continue to advocate rehabilitation as a goal of their juve-
nile justice systems.219  Several considerations conducive to a
delinquent’s rehabilitation are promoted if he or she is granted a
choice of a jury or bench trial.  First, research indicates that allowing
young people to make choices as to their treatment enhances favorable
evaluations of the law, leading to greater compliance with the law in
the future.220  Specifically, the data suggests that children’s percep-
tions of fair procedures are based on: “[T]he degree to which [they are]
given the opportunity to express [their] feelings or concerns, the neu-
trality and fact-based quality of the decision-making process, whether
the child was treated with respect and politeness, and whether the
218. See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.  At least one court has held
under state law that a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding has the right to
choose either a bench or jury trial.  R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 35 (Alaska 1971)
(mandating bench trial in a juvenile proceeding unless the juvenile, after consult-
ing with counsel, asserts state constitutional right to jury trial).  Other courts in
criminal cases have recognized, under state constitutional provisions, that the
prosecution has no right to veto a defendant’s decision to waive his jury trial
rights and instead opt for a bench trial. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Mont.
Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 863 P.2d 1027 (Mont. 1993); State v. Baker, 976 P.2d
1132 (Or. 1999).  Such state law decisions are not inconsistent with Singer:
The Supreme Court in Singer did not hold that, as a matter of consti-
tutional law, approval by the state or the trial court was necessary
before the right to jury trial could be waived by a defendant.  It simply
held that there was no constitutional right to a trial before the court
without a jury and that the method for waiver chosen by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which required approval of the prosecution and
trial court was not unconstitutional.
State ex rel. Nelson, 863 P.2d at 1029.
219. See, e.g., supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (noting the Washington sys-
tem’s embrace of both “punishment” and “treatment” of juvenile offenders).  Like-
wise, Kansas has adopted a determinate sentencing scheme similar to
Washington’s and also includes as a statutory goal “improv[ing] the ability of
juveniles to live productively . . . in the community.” KAN. STAT. ANN § 38-1601
(2000 & Cum. Supp. 2010).  For evidence of the punitive nature of the Kansas
system, see the discussion of In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008), infra note 322.
In the view of some commentators, these diverse goals lead to the conclusion that
a sound model of juvenile justice should incorporate both retributive and rehabili-
tative dimensions. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 140.
While empirical studies have generally offered little hope for the efficacy of
rehabilitation programs for either adult or juvenile offenders, some studies sug-
gest that some programs are successful in treating serious juvenile offenders. See
Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 12, at 1118 n.18. See generally Sheffer,
supra note 74.
220. Birckhead, supra note 12, at 1478; Fondacaro et al., supra note 12, at 976
(“[E]ven those who fail to prevail on their [legal dispute] nonetheless exhibit
greater outcome satisfaction and express greater willingness to accept the deci-
sion when the procedures used to reach the decision are perceived as fair.”).
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authorities appeared to be acting out of benevolent and caring mo-
tives.”221  Thus, allowing juveniles the right to choose either a jury or
bench trial may enhance their perception of fairness within the
process.222
Furthermore, the right to choose a bench trial allows for the possi-
bility of a closed, or relatively closed, hearing which may limit the
stigma and lasting impact of being adjudicated a delinquent.223  In
fact, most teenage males engage in some criminal conduct, leading
some researchers to conclude that delinquency is a “normal part of
teen life.”224  At the same time, most adolescent delinquents desist
from antisocial behavior after reaching majority.225  Thus, while hold-
ing adolescents accountable for their criminal actions through puni-
tive dispositions is perfectly defensible, the response should be
“tailored to protect rather than damage the prospects for a productive
future of adolescents whose desistance is probable.”226  Allowing the
defendant the choice to close the proceedings is one way to protect—
rather than damage—that future.227
If acts of delinquency are in a sense “normal” for most adolescents,
it is largely because adolescents are categorically unique in ways that
make them less culpable than adults for their actions and, at the same
221. Birckhead, supra note 12, at 1478.
222. Id. at 1486 (suggesting the need for future research into juveniles’ perceptions of
fairness related to jury trials).
223. Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 187; see also Kristin Henning, Eroding Confi-
dentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Au-
thorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 526–30, 539–42 (2004) (discussing
various ways the stigma accompanying publicity of delinquency proceeding nega-
tively impacts juveniles).
224. Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 154 (quoting Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited
and Life Course Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100
PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993)).
225. Id. at 154.
226. Id. at 187.
227. Id.; see R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (finding right to jury trial
under state constitution but only when demanded by juvenile); see also INST. OF
JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, Stan-
dard 4.1 (1980) [hereinafter IJA/ABA STANDARDS] (advocating that jury trials be
provided only upon the demand of the juvenile accused); infra notes 243–51 and
accompanying text (discussing a right to choose between either an open or closed
proceeding as an aspect of the right to a public trial).  While closing juvenile pro-
ceedings may be objected to as compromising the public interest in knowing the
identity of dangerous offenders so as to protect against future harm, see Note,
The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1540, 1558 (1983), under current practice in many jurisdictions such offenders,
assuming they could be identified, may well have been waived into the adult
criminal system.
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time, more able than adults to make desirable changes in their
lives.228  As the Supreme Court has recently pointed out:
As compared to adults, juveniles have a lack of maturity and an underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility; they are more vulnerable or susceptible to nega-
tive influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure and their
characters are not as well formed.
. . . .
. . .  Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their ac-
tions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably depraved character than
are the actions of adults.  It remains true that from a moral standpoint it
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult,
for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.229
Such factors argue in favor of allowing juvenile defendants a right
to choose between jury or bench trials even though such choice may
not be available to their adult counterparts.  These considerations pro-
vide justification for a constitutional right to choose a bench trial con-
trary to Singer. Singer left open the possibility of a right to a bench
trial if “some circumstances” and “factors” are so compelling that they
outweigh the “impartial trial” interest promoted by jury trials.230  The
Court itself has accepted the constitutional validity of bench trials.231
Furthermore, it has also acknowledged that adolescents constitute a
228. First, the scientific evidence indicates that teens are simply less compe-
tent decisionmakers than adults, largely because typical features of ado-
lescent psycho-social development contribute to immature judgment.
Adolescent capacities for autonomous choice, self-management, risk per-
ception and calculation of future consequences are deficient as compared
to those of adults, and these traits influence decisionmaking in ways
that can lead to risky conduct.  Second, adolescence is a developmental
period in which personal identity and character are in flux, and begin to
take shape through a process of exploration and experimentation.
Youthful involvement in crime is often a part of this process, and, as
such, it reflects the values and preferences of a transitory stage, rather
than those of an individual with a settled identity.  Most young law vio-
lators do not become adult criminals, because their youthful choices are
shaped by factors and processes that are peculiar to (and characteristic
of) adolescence.
Because these developmental factors influence their criminal choices,
young wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional
criminal law conceptions of mitigation.
Elizabeth S. Scott & Lawrence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
801 (2003).
229. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (holding imposition of life without parole sentence on juve-
nile offender who did not commit homicide unconstitutional under Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment).  For a summary of the
social science assessing culpability of adolescents, see Feld, Unmitigated Punish-
ment, supra note 10, at 45–61.
230. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37–38 (1965); see supra note 189 and accom-
panying text.
231. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (holding waiver of jury trial
permissible in federal criminal trials); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
46 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1
categorically distinct constitutional class with unique rehabilitative
amenabilities and diminished culpability.232  It may well be that a
bench trial, with its absence of publicity, affords an accused adolescent
a more “impartial trial” than does a jury proceeding that risks publicly
stigmatizing a juvenile as a guilty offender.  Therefore, the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury should be understood as also grant-
ing a right to a bench trial to adolescent offenders due to their unique
status.233  However, whether or not a federal constitutional right to
waive jury trial exists, it is clearly constitutionally permissible to al-
low such a right either under state constitutional provisions234 or leg-
islative enactment.235
2. Public Trials in Juvenile Courts
a. Policy Considerations
As mentioned above, public trials have long been thought to pro-
vide such benefits as alerting witnesses unknown to the parties, edu-
cating the public about the legal system, and checking possible
judicial abuses through contemporaneous review in the forum of pub-
lic opinion.236  These benefits are not limited to criminal courts.  As
one court put it, “[t]he reasons for the constitutional guarantees of
public trial apply as much to juvenile delinquency proceedings as to
adult criminal proceedings.”237
First, the possibility of alerting unknown witnesses can be espe-
cially important in situations where their input prevents the unjust
infliction of punishment that would otherwise be imposed.  Unjustly
punishing a juvenile is surely no more defensible than doing so to an
adult.  Second, as for the concern with educating the public about the
legal system, the public has a deep interest in the juvenile system.238
Access to its proceedings enhances informed public opinion about both
U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (“[O]ne cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a
necessary component of accurate factfinding.”).
232. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
233. Although “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry
with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right,” Singer, 380 U.S. at
34–35, the right to insist on the opposite articulated right will exist if the consti-
tutional provision granting the right also itself supports its opposite. See, e.g.,
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that defendants who compe-
tently and intelligently waive counsel rights have a corresponding right to pro-
ceed pro se under the language and history of the Sixth Amendment); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
the states).
234. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Mont. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 863 P.2d 1027
(Mont. 1993); State v. Baker, 976 P.2d 1132 (Or. 1999).
235. See, e.g., IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 227.
236. See supra notes 76–77, 142, 152–55 and accompanying text.
237. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971).
238. Note, supra note 227, at 1549.
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reform and administration of the system.239  Finally, the interest in
checking abuses of power by judges and other court functionaries is
especially important in juvenile courts because abuses are not easily
checked through the appellate process.240  Juvenile judges exercise
more discretion than their criminal law counterparts in making dispo-
sitions, even in systems permitting punishment specifically linked to
offenses.241  In addition, juvenile court judges, at least historically,
have also been viewed as less qualified and competent than other
judges.242
b. Waiver of Public Trial Rights: A Juvenile Right to a
Closed Hearing?
As discussed above, recognition of the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right would not require juries in all punitive juvenile justice cases.243
Bench trial proceedings could be available as a matter of right either
constitutionally or by state law.244  The considerations justifying a
right to choose a jury or a bench trial would also be significant when
determining the corresponding right of juveniles to choose a closed or
open proceeding.
Thus far the Court has held that First Amendment interests can be
overridden only if compelling interests, determined on a case-by-case
basis, outweigh the public’s interest in access to criminal proceed-
ings.245  However, because the Court has recently recognized adoles-
239. Id. at 1550–51.
240. See supra note 196.
241. Note, supra note 227, at 1550.  Juvenile courts in Kansas have discretion to im-
pose a variety of dispositions, ranging from probation to determinate sentences in
correction facilities. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 169 (Kan. 2008).  For a discussion
of In re L.M., see infra note 322.  For similar examples of courts with broad dis-
cretion in determinate sentencing schemes, see Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 859, 867, 869, 871 (discussing New Jersey,
Kentucky, Ohio, and Minnesota, respectively).  The Washington State provisions
also allow broad discretion in imposing punitive dispositions. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.40.150, 13.40.160 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
242. Note, supra note 227, at 1550.
243. See supra notes 173–89, 215–35 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
245. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) (holding that
compelling interest of protecting child victim witness from trauma of testifying
did not justify mandatory closure of trial proceeding—a “court can determine on a
case-by-case basis” whether closure is necessary to protect a particular minor).
As an aspect of the traditional rehabilitative juvenile court model, closure of
proceedings was often deemed necessary.  While some courts require closure, in-
cluding press denial, in all cases, see, for example, In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125 (Vt.
1981), most courts “tend to hold that closure of juvenile hearings is appropriate
as long as the public or the press is provided an opportunity to present evidence
and argument that in a given case the state’s or juvenile’s right to privacy is
outweighed by concern for public safety or a similar public interest.” SAMUEL M.
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cents as a distinct class, categorically less culpable than adults and
especially amenable to rehabilitation,246 it is possible the Court might
see a “compelling interest”247 in allowing juveniles to choose closed
proceedings.  Thus, granting juveniles a categorical right to opt for clo-
sure,248 thereby ameliorating the negative effects open proceedings
DAVIS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS: CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1156 (4th
ed. 2009).
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the constitutionality of
excluding the public in traditional juvenile court proceedings, it has expressed
dicta suggesting that closure would be permitted.  In Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), the Court held unconstitutional a statute subject-
ing newspapers to a criminal penalty for publishing the name of a juvenile
offender without written authorization of the juvenile court.  The name of the
juvenile had been obtained by interviewing witnesses at the crime scene. Id. at
99.  The Court held that the state’s interest in protecting an offender’s anonymity
as an aid to his rehabilitation did not outweigh the First Amendment rights in-
volved. Id. at 106.  The Court noted in dicta, however:
Our holding in this case is narrow.  There is no issue before us of
unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings, . . . there is no
issue here of privacy or prejudicial pretrial publicity.  At issue is simply
the power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged juve-
nile delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a newspaper.  The asserted
state interest cannot justify the statute’s imposition of criminal sanc-
tions on this type of publication.
Id. at 105–06 (footnote and citation omitted).
246. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
247. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607 (“[I]t must be shown that . . . denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest.”).  The Globe Court found “safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor” sexual abuse victim to be a
“compelling interest,” albeit not one justifying mandatory closure of all proceed-
ings in which child victim witnesses testify. Id. at 607–08.
248. In the opinion of Chief Justice Burger, the Globe case does not foreclose a state
from mandating closure in all situations where a child victim witness will testify,
except where the child agrees to testify in open court. Id. at 612 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).  If this view is correct, child victims would essentially be given the
categorical right to choose either closed or open trials.
At least one court has recognized a right for juveniles in delinquency proceed-
ings to choose either statutorily mandated closed proceedings or open proceedings
under state constitutional provisions specifying a right to a public trial.  R.L.R. v.
State, 487 P.2d 27, 38–39 (Alaska 1971).
The IJA/ABA Standards recommend that defendants in delinquency adjudi-
cations be given a similar categorical right to choose private over public trials.
Section 6.2 provides:
A.  Each jurisdiction should provide by law that the respondent, after
consulting with counsel, may waive the right to a public trial.
. . . .
C.  The judge of the juvenile court should honor any request by the re-
spondent, respondent’s attorney, or family that specified members of the
public be permitted to observe the respondent’s adjudication proceeding
when the respondent has waived the right to a public trial.
IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 227, Standard 6.2.
Commentators have argued that “policies of maintaining the anonymity of ju-
venile defendants in the press and of giving accused juveniles the right to choose
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can have on juvenile defendants.249  It is at least arguable that
juveniles’ interests in rehabilitation are strong enough to outweigh
the public educational interest of the First Amendment.  Whether or
not a total denial of access to punitive juvenile justice trials would be
constitutionally permissible, it seems clear that it would be constitu-
tional to employ the less drastic alternative of allowing conditional ac-
cess to the press and other interested individuals, pursuant to an
agreement with the court not to disseminate sensitive aspects of the
proceedings, particularly the offender’s identity.250
3. Summary
Recognition that juvenile trials are “criminal prosecutions” entails
not only rights to either a jury or a bench trial but also rights to either
a public or a closed proceeding, or at least one protecting the anonym-
ity of the defendant.  It might also be possible to opt for a jury trial in
the context of an otherwise closed proceeding.  In such situations,
members of the jury could be precluded from disclosing the identity of
the defendant.251  Thus, bringing Sixth Amendment protections to pu-
nitive juvenile courts would afford an array of new benefits—even
some not enjoyed by defendants in criminal court—to those charged
with acts of delinquency.
Whether visiting Sixth Amendment protections upon delinquency
adjudications would constitute a significant change in the actual
workings of those proceedings depends on how readily defendants re-
quest juries and opt for public trials.252  Policy makers favoring the
traditional rehabilitative model requiring closed bench trial proceed-
a closed hearing may limit the stigma of delinquency status and its lasting im-
pact.”  Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 187.
249. See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. But see Note, supra note 227, at
1557–58 (arguing that open proceedings visit little harm to juvenile defendants).
250. See Note, supra note 227, at 1562–64.  Such conditional access is recommended
by IJA/ABA Standard 6.3(A) which provides: “Each jurisdiction should provide
by law that members of the public permitted by the judge of the juvenile court to
observe adjudication proceedings may not disclose to others the identity of the
respondent when the respondent has waived the right to a public trial.” IJA/ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 227, Standard 6.3(A).
For a helpful discussion of the IJA/ABA Standards as compared to other pro-
posed legislation, see Edward J. McLaughlin & Lucia Beadel Whisenand, Jury
Trial, Public Trial and Free Press in Juvenile Proceedings: An Analysis and Com-
parison of the IJA/ABA, Task Force and NAC Standards, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 1
(1979).
251. See supra note 250.
252. A number of states already provide for juries in adjudication proceedings either
by statute or by judicial decision applying state constitutional provisions. See
DAVIS, supra note 31, at 354–57.  A majority of states have declared by statute
that hearings should be conducted without a jury. Id.  Most states also continue
the tradition of closed proceedings in hopes of keeping the identity of juvenile
offenders confidential.  Henning, supra note 223, at 532.
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ings may see these Sixth Amendment innovations as too costly finan-
cially, or undesirable on other grounds.  If so, the innovations can be
avoided simply by refraining from imposing punitive dispositions.
IV. IDENTIFYING PUNITIVE DISPOSITIONS
Identifying whether a juvenile court disposition is punitive is es-
sential to determining whether Sixth Amendment public jury trial
rights are required.253  Unfortunately, a review of the lower court case
law considering the issue reveals an almost universal absence of effec-
tive judicial analysis.  Some courts simply reach conclusions without
even attempting to identify the presence or absence of the punitive
sanction.254  Others fail to distinguish punishment from rehabilita-
253. See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., In re D.J., 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002), discussed in detail infra note 274.  In
A.C., IV v. People, 16 P.3d 240 (Colo. 2001), the court denied a jury trial to a
juvenile found guilty of criminal negligent homicide, thereby subjecting him to a
potential commitment to a state institution for more than six months.  The court
made no attempt to assess whether the confinement might be punitive, but in-
stead assumed it to be rehabilitative, citing McKeiver for authority. See id. at
244.  Similarly, the Court in State ex rel Upham v. McElligott, 956 P.2d 179 (Or.
1998), denied a jury trial to a juvenile charged with various acts of sexual assault.
The court made no mention of possible disposition (although an earlier case in-
volving similar offenses subjected a juvenile to a presumptive sentence of sixteen
to eighteen-months imprisonment) and assumed a rehabilitative disposition, cit-
ing McKeiver. See id. at 182.  In In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998),
the court denied a right to a jury trial, concluding that “concern for the juvenile
remains a cornerstone of our system of juvenile justice” even though statutory
revisions invited “imposition of accountability for offenses” as a dispositional
foundation. Id. at 471 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6352 (amended 1995)).
The court made no mention of the possible disposition in the specific case or
whether it might have been punitive.  Citing McKeiver, the court concluded that
“dispositional alternatives available to the court remain rehabilitative and are
not punitive in nature.” Id. at 473.  In State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Klamath
Cnty. v. Reynolds, 857 P.2d 842 (Or. 1993), the court relied heavily on McKeiver
in denying jury trial rights under a system the court deemed rehabilitative, even
though the dispositional system specified maximum periods of confinement based
on the offense committed.  The court did not consider whether the offense-based
dispositions might be punitive. See id.  A similar approach was taken by the
court in Valdez v. State, 801 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).  The court in In re
J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1128 (Vt. 1981), upheld a statute mandating closure of juve-
nile proceedings by concluding without analysis that “the juvenile proceed-
ing . . . involves . . . no punishment.”  Without any analysis, nor even a cite to
McKeiver, the court in Elkins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983), found
juvenile dispositions rehabilitative, thus justifying denial of jury trial rights.  In
State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573 (Me. 1979), a fourteen-year-old was denied a jury
trial and given an indefinite commitment to the Maine Youth Center for theft of
beer from a store.  The court supported the denial of a jury trial by referring to
the rehabilitative purposes spelled out in the juvenile court statutes and made no
assessment of the actual nature of the juvenile’s commitment (possibly for four
years) or whether it might have been punitive, even though it might have lasted
much longer than that permitted for an adult committing the same offense. See
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tion by applying overly broad definitions of rehabilitation, conflating
the concept of punishment into that of rehabilitation, causing the
courts to state such things as “treatment is often disguised punish-
ment”255 and “punishment . . . does as much to rehabilitate . . . an
errant youth as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the particu-
lar characteristics of the individual juvenile.”256  Still others apply an
overly broad definition of punishment, unduly emphasizing the signif-
icance of the conditions of a given sanction as they impact its recipi-
ent, resulting in conflating the concept of rehabilitation into that of
punishment.257  Very few courts engage in the necessary process of
carefully identifying punitive dispositions, which trigger Sixth
Amendment applicability, and distinguishing them from rehabilita-
tive ones, which do not.
This Part illustrates these points by considering several examples
from a host of badly reasoned cases.  The cases will be critiqued and
id. at 580–81.  Similarly, in In re Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 47, 48–50 (Iowa 1977), the
court sustained the denial of a jury trial by simply concluding that the proceed-
ings were not a “prosecution[ ] for crime” under the state constitution, citing
McKeiver as authority.  The court made no assessment of the actual nature of
juvenile court dispositions.  Another court essentially begged the Sixth Amend-
ment question by merely citing McKeiver: “It is argued that the imposition of a
minimum . . . ‘sentence,’ in excess of . . . six month[s] . . . mandates trial by jury.
This argument does violence to the actual holding of McKeiver.”  William M. v.
Harold B., 393 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977).  In Raines v. Alabama,
317 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1975), the court upheld a denial of jury trial to a youth facing
a possible commitment to the custody of the department of corrections for up to
three years.  Without assessing the actual nature of juvenile court dispositions
the court simply concluded the proceedings were “not criminal in nature,” citing
McKeiver. Id. at 562.  For still another case where a court denied that juvenile
proceedings are “criminal prosecutions” under the Sixth Amendment by referring
to McKeiver with little additional analysis, see In re J.I., Jr., 290 A.2d 821 (D.C.
1972).
255. State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 415 (W. Va. 1980).  Such talk
caused a fellow judge to accuse its speaker of adopting “a punishment model of
treatment for juvenile offenders.” Id. at 416 (McGraw, J., concurring).
256. State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979); see, e.g., In re Myresheia v.
Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (denial of jury trial,
“while part of the juvenile system does include punishment . . . it does not change
the primary purpose of juvenile proceedings from that of preserving and promot-
ing the welfare of the child”); In re Charles C., 284 Cal. Rptr. 4, 9 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (denial of jury trial, “[t]he state’s punishment of minors is a ‘rehabilitative
tool’”); In re L.C., 548 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Ga. 2001) (denial of jury trial, “although
[the juvenile statutes] ha[ve] some punitive aspects, one of the primary functions
is the treatment and rehabilitation of the child”); In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d
947, 950–51 (Nev. 1983) (waiver proceeding from juvenile to criminal court, “pun-
ishment has in many cases a rehabilitative effect on the child”); In re David J.,
421 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (denial of jury trial, “a period of
mandatory placement in a secure facility where . . . rehabilitation [is] available”
promotes “the best interests of youths” committing acts which would be serious
crimes if committed by adults).
257. This faulty definition is characterized as the “impact theory.” See supra note 61.
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analyzed in terms of the conceptual distinction between punishment
and rehabilitation offered above258 in an attempt to illustrate how
those and similar future cases should be resolved.  A rare example of a
well reasoned opinion will then be considered in contrast.  Finally,
McKeiver itself will be rethought in terms of the punishment/rehabili-
tation framework in an endeavor to determine whether McKeiver has
become dead letter.
A. Failing to Effectively Analyze the Issue
1. Begging the Question
As mentioned above, some courts—when presented with questions
of whether juvenile proceedings are criminal prosecutions for Sixth
Amendment purposes—simply beg the constitutional question by fail-
ing to even raise the possibility that a given disposition might be puni-
tive.259  A Delaware case, State v. J.K.,260 is a vivid example.  The J.K.
court upheld the constitutionality261 of a statute which required insti-
tutional confinement for one year262 of any juvenile adjudicated a de-
linquent based on the commission of two or more statutorily
designated felonies within a one-year period.  The case raised the is-
sue whether the mandatory commitment provision denied juveniles
Sixth Amendment jury trial rights.  While declining to rule on the jury
trial issue because it was not adequately briefed, the court did find
that mandatory commitments under the statute were rehabilitative in
nature, leading it to suggest strongly that no jury trial right existed by
“invit[ing] the attention of the Trial Courts”263 to a series of cases,
including McKeiver, that denied the right.
The Court never addressed the possibility that mandatory determi-
nate confinement for the commission of multiple felonies might consti-
tute punishment.  Instead, it simply assumed it to be rehabilitative by
referring to the statute’s purpose clause, which placed delinquency
matters within the “civil jurisdiction” of the court in order to achieve
“control, care, and treatment” of the juvenile.264  The court observed
that the “object of the legislation, rehabilitation . . . is a compelling
258. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 254.
260. State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283 (Del. 1977).
261. Under equal protection attack, the court upheld the statute which permitted
juveniles waived to criminal court to possibly receive probation, while those com-
mitting the same offenses who remained in juvenile court were ineligible for pro-
bation and received mandatory six-month sentences. Id. at 289.
262. At the time of J.K., the statute allowed judicial discretion to suspend confinement
in excess of six months, see id. at 285, but was later amended to remove judicial
discretion to suspend mandatory commitments. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1009(c) (West 1999).
263. J.K., 383 A.2d at 292.
264. Id. at 286–87.
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State interest”265 reflected in the mandatory sentencing law which
constituted “an attempt to salvage something in a juvenile who has
committed . . . two separate felonies in one year [which] begin[s] with
a mandatory commitment for a six-month minimum.”266
Such analysis obviously begs the constitutional question of
whether the six-month confinements constitute punishment.  Had the
J.K. court addressed the punishment issue under the framework de-
veloped in this Article,267 the court would have concluded that the
confinements were punitive, thereby mandating jury trials.  Because
the proceedings are labeled “civil,” the burden would be on the juve-
nile to show by “the clearest proof” that he or she faced a possible pu-
nitive disposition.268  Under the punishment definition, the
institutional confinement would surely constitute “unpleasant re-
straint,” obviously imposed “because of an offense.”269  The purposes
of the confinement clearly appear to be aimed at achieving retributive
and deterrent goals.270  The six-month period is fixed and mandatory,
consequently meeting the determinacy aspect of punishment.271  The
juvenile would continue to serve the six-month sentence even if he or
she were rehabilitated.272  The juvenile would be immediately re-
leased, however, if the disposition were truly rehabilitative because
his or her “condition has altered so as no longer to require . . . [any]
further response.”273  Thus, the dispositional scheme at issue in J.K.
makes sense only as punishment for offenses and not as a beneficent
response that meets the rehabilitative needs of offenders.274
265. Id. at 289.
266. Id.  The mandatory minimum was six months because the court could suspend
confinement in excess of six months. See supra note 262.
267. See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 48.
269. See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
272. The statute did permit discretionary release, perhaps because the juvenile had
become rehabilitated, during the second six months of the mandatory one-year
sentence.  State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283, 285 (Del. 1977); see supra note 262 and
accompanying text.
273. Wasserstrom, supra note 55, at 179; see supra note 67.
274. The J.K. case is only one of many cases where courts simply assume a given dis-
position is rehabilitative without analysis. See supra note 254.  One other case is
especially worthy of note.  In In re D.J., 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002), the court re-
jected a juvenile’s argument that Louisiana juvenile courts had “become more
criminal than civil in nature,” thus triggering the right to trial by jury. Id. at 28.
The court made no mention of the possibility that dispositions might be punitive
and found them rehabilitative by citing the purpose clause of the Children’s Code,
referring to McKeiver, and to the many other cases denying jury trials to
juveniles. Id. at 29–30, 34.  The court seemed to assume that if juvenile disposi-
tions were not exactly the same as those for adults committing the same offense,
the juvenile dispositions were necessarily nonpunitive.  The court observed:
54 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1
2. Confusing the Concepts of Punishment and Rehabilitation:
Conflating Punishment into Rehabilitation
While some courts decide the public jury trial issues by simply as-
suming the absence of a punitive disposition, others address the pun-
ishment question but mistakenly equate the concepts of punishment
and rehabilitation,275 thus precluding sound analysis. State v. Cha-
vez276 is a vivid example of judicial failure to carefully distinguish pu-
nitive and rehabilitative dispositions in order to decide the jury trial
issue.  After being denied his request for a jury trial, fourteen-year-old
Azel Chavez was convicted in juvenile court for attempted murder, un-
lawful possession of a firearm, armed robbery, armed assault, and
theft of a motor vehicle.277  Chavez had no criminal history and was
given the “standard range” disposition for three counts of attempted
murder under statutory sentencing guidelines,278 amounting to a sen-
tence of 309–387 weeks confinement in a juvenile detention facility.279
In sustaining the jury trial denial, the Washington Supreme Court
recognized that Chavez’s disposition was punitive,280 but adhered to a
line of earlier cases that characterized the Washington system as par-
[T]here remains a great disparity in the severity of penalties faced by a
juvenile charged with delinquency and an adult defendant charged with
the same crime. . . .  An adult defendant convicted of the identical charge
would face a maximum sentence of 55 years imprisonment at hard labor,
50 years without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
Id. at 33.  In perhaps inadvertently admitting the punitive nature of Louisiana
dispositions, the court said this in comparing those dispositions to those of other
states:
Notably, the Louisiana legislature, unlike some of its counterparts,
has not elected to enact legislation that would enable the state to punish
juveniles under the age of 14 at the time of the offense beyond their 21st
birthdays.  In highly publicized cases from other states, juveniles
younger than D.J. have faced, and sometimes received sentences of life
imprisonment. . . .  In contrast, in Louisiana, juveniles adjudicated delin-
quent who were under the age of 14 when they committed the offense
may be incarcerated only until their 21st birthdays.
Id.  Such comparisons of juvenile dispositions to those of adults and between Lou-
isiana dispositions and those of other states are obviously beside the point.
Whatever the comparisons, if Louisiana dispositions are punitive, public jury
trial rights are triggered.
275. See, e.g., supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
276. State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d 1250 (Wash. 2008).
277. Id. at 1251.
278. Id.  The Washington scheme involves a presumptive sentencing system based on
present offense, age of the offender, and the offender’s prior record.  Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 854.  The sentencing judge
classifies a youth as a minor, middle, or serious offender and then refers to sen-
tencing guidelines detailing a dispositional schedule that prescribes the standard
range of sentences for a youth with that offense record. Id.  The judge must fol-
low the guidelines and cannot set indeterminate sentences. Id.
279. Chavez, 180 P.3d at 1251.
280. See id. at 1254; infra note 286 and accompanying text.
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tially punitive but primarily rehabilitative at the same time.281  The
Chavez court observed that while punishment is the primary purpose
of the adult criminal system, the juvenile system embraces the two-
fold purposes of “responding to the needs of youthful offenders, and
[holding] juveniles accountable for their offenses.”282  While acknowl-
edging that “juvenile proceedings are similar to adult criminal prose-
cutions, enough distinctions still exist to justify denying juvenile
offenders the right to a trial by jury.”283  The court elaborated on the
distinctions by noting that, unlike adults, juveniles may be eligible for
diversion programs in lieu of prosecution, and those found guilty if
prosecuted will normally be sent to juvenile detention facilities.284
Moreover, incarcerated juveniles receive more effective psychotherapy
than that afforded adult prisoners, as well as an array of educational
services, treatment options, and spiritual and cultural programs not
necessarily available to adult inmates.285  Finally, the court noted the
relative leniency of juvenile punishment as a basis for denying jury
trials:
[T]he juvenile code provides for much more lenient penalties [than the crimi-
nal law], a difference that weighs heavily in the balance between the two sys-
tems for purposes of a juvenile’s right to a jury trial. . . .
. . .  [B]y remaining in the juvenile system, Chavez received a substantially
lesser penalty upon finding of guilt.  Whereas in the juvenile system, one
count of attempted first degree murder is punishable by 103 to 129 weeks
(about 2 to 2 1/2 years), the same count in the adult criminal system is punish-
able by 180 to 240 months (15 to 20 years).  This illustration reinforces the
difference between the predominantly rehabilitative philosophy of the juve-
nile justice system and the punitive philosophy of the adult criminal
system.286
It is, of course, hardly obvious that punishing juveniles less se-
verely than similarly situated adults “reinforces . . . the predomi-
nantly rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile justice system.”287
Rather, what is “reinforced” is that the Washington system is at best a
mixed system of punishment and rehabilitation, much like the adult
criminal system.288  In such situations, the punitive aspects take
prominence over the rehabilitative ones in assessing Sixth Amend-
ment rights.289  Because Chavez faced a punitive disposition in excess
281. Chavez, 180 P.3d at 1253–54; see supra notes 84–89, 256 and accompanying text.
282. Chavez, 180 P.3d at 1252.
283. Id. at 1253 (quoting State v. J.H., 978 P.2d 1121, 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. at 1254.
285. Id.
286. Id. (footnote omitted).
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 36, 70–73 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
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of six months, he was entitled to a jury trial290 regardless of the reha-
bilitative services available to him during his punitive confinement.
Under the conceptual framework developed in this Article, there
can be little doubt that Chavez was unjustifiably denied a right to
trial by jury.  By listing punishment as a statutory purpose,291 Cha-
vez’s sentence may be presumed to be punitive under Supreme Court
case law.292  However, even if the statutory purpose is deemed
nonpunitive in light of the fact that rehabilitation is also articulated
as a statutory goal, Chavez could easily provide the “clearest proof”
that he was subjected to punishment.293  His sentence meets all the
characteristics of punishment.  Confinement in a closed institution for
over seven years surely constitutes an “unpleasant restraint” on lib-
erty, whatever the conditions of the facility.294  Furthermore, the dis-
position is obviously based on the offenses committed according to the
sentencing guidelines proportioning sentences to the seriousness of of-
fenses.295  Washington sentences are determinate and must be served
for their duration.296  Clearly, retributive and deterrent purposes
provide the foundation for such dispositions.  If the disposition were
rehabilitative, Chavez would be released upon rehabilitation,
“his . . . condition [being] altered so as no longer to require . . . [any]
further response,”297 rather than being required to serve the term of
his determinate sentence.  While Chavez hopefully received some re-
habilitation while serving his sentence, he was obviously subjected to
punitive confinement in excess of six months and thus denied his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
3. Defining Punishment Under the “Impact Theory”: Conflating
Rehabilitation into Punishment
Unlike courts that beg the constitutional question, or mistakenly
conflate punishment into rehabilitation by applying overly broad defi-
nitions of rehabilitation, some courts make the opposite mistake of
conflating rehabilitation and other coercive sanctions into the notion
of punishment by applying an overly broad definition of punishment.
Instead of adhering to the conceptual scheme developed above, which
requires a motivational assessment for imposing a given sanction in
290. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
291. See Chavez, 180 P.3d at 1252; supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 48, 57–58 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 278.
296. The Washington scheme requires that an incarcerated youth serve sixty percent
of the minimum sentence imposed with a release date set by the court thereafter.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 854.  This
manifests a determinate system imposing mandatory minimum sentences.
297. Wasserstrom, supra note 55, at 179; see supra note 67.
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determining whether or not it is punitive,298 some courts—when de-
termining whether a given sanction is punitive—resort to defining
punishment solely in terms of the extent to which the impact of the
sanction on its recipient is experienced as unpleasant, without engag-
ing in the necessary determination of the purposes for the sanction’s
imposition.  This erroneous definition is characterized as the “impact
theory of punishment”—application of which makes it impossible to
properly distinguish punishment from other coercive sanctions that
manifest an unpleasant impact upon those sanctioned, sometimes
even more severe than the impact experienced by recipients of
punishment.299
For example, in In re Hezzie R.,300 the court considered whether
Wisconsin juvenile dispositions were punitive in deciding the jury
trial issue raised in the case.  Even though the court noted that recent
legislative revisions had listed holding juveniles personally “accounta-
ble” as a statutory objective within a “balanced approach” alongside
the traditional goal of rehabilitation,301 the court found that the possi-
bility of several years confinement in a secured juvenile correctional
facility was not punitive, thus permitting denial of Sixth Amendment
jury trial rights.302  On the other hand, the court deemed punitive a
statutory provision permitting the possible transfer of juveniles from
secured juvenile facilities to adult prisons in situations where a juve-
nile “presents a serious problem to the juvenile or others.”303  Disposi-
298. See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text.
299. The “impact theory” is described supra, note 61.  In addition to the text immedi-
ately forthcoming, the following represents a clear example of the impact theory:
Delinquency proceedings have all the hallmarks of a criminal prosecu-
tion.  The basis of the charge of delinquency is the commission of a crimi-
nal offense, and, if found delinquent, a juvenile can be incarcerated in
the Department of Corrections until he is 21 years old.  This is a classic
case of crime and punishment.
. . . .
. . .  However one chooses to characterize the purpose of the juvenile
justice system, the fact remains that “the incarcerated juveniles’ liberty
. . . is restrained just as effectively as that of the adult inmates serving
terms in State and Federal prisons.”
In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1015–16 (Ill. 2000) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (altera-
tion in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Urbasek, 232 N.E.2d 716, 719
(Ill. 1967)).  “When commitment to an adult facility is permitted . . . the juvenile
is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury.” In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d 4, 6 (N.H.
2001).  See a similar example of the impact theory infra notes 300–20 and the
accompanying text.
300. In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1998).
301. Id. at 675.
302. Id. at 673.
303. Id. at 673–74.  The court found the adult prison transfer provision unconstitu-
tional because it subjected juveniles to “criminal prosecutions” under the Sixth
Amendment, without allowing for the right to trial by jury. Id. at 674.  The court
then severed the provision from the remainder of the juvenile code. Id. at
674–75.
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tions in either the juvenile or adult facilities were indeterminate and
subject to an individualized “permanency plan” aimed at “ensur[ing]
that [the] juvenile [be] reunified with his family whenever possible,”
with the underlying goal that he receive “treatment . . . meeting [his]
physical, emotional, social, educational and vocation needs.”304
The court based its distinction between juvenile and adult facilities
solely upon its perception of the different conditions of the respective
facilities, without taking into account the purpose(s) of confine-
ment.305  The adult facilities manifested a harsher impact and were
therefore deemed punitive.  Referring with approval to other cases
concluding that “although the focus of the Children’s code was rehabil-
itation . . . subjecting juveniles to placement in adult prisons result[s]
in ‘punitive incarceration,’”306 the Hezzie R. court observed:
“Juveniles transferred under these provisions are subject to place-
ment in the exact environment to which adults with criminal convic-
tions are subject.  In addition, those juveniles are subject to being
housed with the general population of criminally convicted adults.”307
Merely being housed in such an environment was enough to convince
the court that the confinement was punitive.308
However, if being placed in an adult prison by itself constitutes
punishment, it would follow that pretrial detention in a jail with con-
victed misdemeanants would also constitute punishment, and would
thus be unconstitutional.309  Yet, the Supreme Court has held that
jailing a juvenile awaiting adjudication is not punishment because the
purposes of the jailing are nonpunitive.310  Thus, the harsh impact of
a given confinement itself cannot establish its punitive nature.  Only a
harsh impact imposed for punitive purposes constitutes
punishment.311
For the Hezzie R. court to simply conclude that confinement in ju-
venile facilities is nonpunitive because life there is less harsh than
that in adult prisons overlooks the possibility that life in both facilities
304. Id. at 669–70.
305. The juvenile facilities solely housed juveniles “allowing the focus of juvenile treat-
ment and rehabilitation to remain intact.” Id. at 673.  Apart from being housed
with adult criminals, the court did not describe how the adult prisons differed
from the juvenile facilities.
306. Id. at 674 (quoting In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 396 (La. 1998)).
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. See the discussion of Bell v. Wolfish, supra note 37.
310. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (detaining juveniles thought to pose a
serious risk of committing crimes if released did not constitute preadjudication
punishment because the confinement was motivated by the nonpunitive purpose
of preventing future crime); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979) (holding
pretrial detention in a jail facility to be nonpunitive because it was motivated by
the nonpunitive purpose of assuring the detainee’s presence at trial).
311. See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
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could either be punitive or rehabilitative.  Assessments of punishment
are impossible without determining the purposes of confinement in
the respective facilities.312
In fact, the Hezzie R. court afforded no basis for concluding that the
purposes of confinement in the adult facilities were more punitive
than those applicable to the juvenile facilities.  Juveniles were trans-
ferred to adult prisons not for retribution or deterrence313 but because
they posed a “serious problem” to themselves or others while housed
in the juvenile facility.314  The purpose of the commitment to adult
prisons thus appears more a matter of preventive detention315 than
punishment, especially in light of the fact that the commitments were
indeterminate, permitting release “whenever possible.”316
Had the Hezzie R. court applied the framework presented in this
Article, it would have concluded that confinement in neither the adult
nor the juvenile facilities constituted punishment for purposes of as-
sessing Sixth Amendment jury trial rights.  Because the legislature
effectively labeled juvenile dispositions “civil,”317 the burden would be
on juveniles asserting jury trial rights to show by the “clearest proof”
that they were subjected to punishment.318  While confinements in ei-
ther the juvenile or adult facilities would constitute “unpleasant re-
straints” imposed “because of an offense,”319 the indeterminate nature
of the disposition in either type of facility would call into question
whether the purposes of the disposition were punitive rather than re-
habilitative.  Because juveniles would apparently be released from
confinement upon rehabilitation,320 their commitment appears reha-
bilitative, thereby making it impossible to satisfy the “clearest proof”
of punishment requirement.  The Hezzie R. court should have con-
cluded that jury trials were not mandated for any juveniles in Wiscon-
312. See supra notes 50–58, 61 and accompanying text.
313. Retribution and deterrence are the purposes defining punishment.  See supra
note 53 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court has observed that
“[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objec-
tives.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.
314. In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 673 (Wis. 1998); see supra note 303 and accom-
panying text.
315. For a discussion of the distinction between preventive detention and punishment,
see Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 809–15.
316. Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d at 669–70.  For a case holding it permissible to commit a
juvenile to adult correctional facilities without affording a jury trial, see In re
Janet R., 353 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
317. Wisconsin statutes had previously provided for jury trials in juvenile cases. Hez-
zie R., 580 N.W.2d at 662–63.  The elimination of the jury trial right indicates
that the Wisconsin Legislature considered juvenile proceedings to be civil mat-
ters and not criminal prosecutions requiring jury trials.
318. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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sin because none risked punitive dispositions.321  This is not to say,
however, that Wisconsin juveniles necessarily received meaningful re-
habilitation, but only to say that they did not receive punishment.
B. Effective Analysis: The Rare Exception
Although the vast majority of courts fall prey to the kinds of faulty
analysis described in subsection IV.A, courts do—on very rare occa-
sions—effectively analyze the question of whether a given juvenile
disposition constitutes punishment when considering the applicability
of Sixth Amendment rights.  While the 2008 decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court in In re L.M. constitutes a well reasoned opinion,322
an earlier New York decision, In re Felder,323 provides an even better
example of succinct, effective analysis that utilizes a conceptual
framework essentially the same as that proposed in this Article.  At-
tention will therefore be focused on Felder.
The Felder court found that Sixth Amendment jury trial rights ap-
plied in delinquency actions brought against juveniles charged with
“designated felon[ies]” under the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
1976.324  The Reform Act was a response to a perceived increase in
serious crime committed by juveniles and was aimed at protecting the
321. The conclusion that the presence of rehabilitation within adult prisons renders
them nonpunitive institutions for purposes of assessing juveniles’ jury trial rights
under the Sixth Amendment does not make the prisons nonpunitive for the
adults incarcerated therein for violations of the criminal law.  The Wisconsin
Legislature almost certainly would have labeled adult dispositions punitive, thus
conclusively establishing their punitive nature. See supra notes 48, 57–58 and
accompanying text.  Moreover, the adult sentences would certainly be determi-
nate, unlike those imposed on juveniles, rendering the adults’ confinements puni-
tive, notwithstanding the rehabilitation inmates might also receive within the
prison. See supra notes 57–59, 71 and accompanying text.
322. While the New York case In re Felder, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978),
will be discussed in detail following immediately in the text, the Kansas Supreme
Court decision in In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008), is also worthy of emula-
tion.  The L.M. court considered the appeal of a juvenile whose request for a jury
trial was denied prior to his being convicted of sexual battery and placed on pro-
bation after the trial court stayed his sentence of eighteen months in a juvenile
correctional facility. Id. at 165.  The sentence was imposed according to sentenc-
ing guidelines, which embodied a determinate sentencing system based on the
level of the offense and in some cases the past adjudication history of the juvenile.
Id. at 169.  The L.M. court found that adoption of the determinate sentencing
scheme—along with other factors such as a legislative abandonment of the tradi-
tional euphemisms of juvenile justice in favor of the terminology of the criminal
system in juvenile cases—evidenced a rejection of the rehabilitative model and a
move towards a system of punitive juvenile justice. Id. at 168–70.  The court
therefore held that juvenile proceedings had become essentially criminal prosecu-
tions, thus requiring Sixth Amendment jury trial rights. Id. at 170.
323. In re Felder, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978).
324. Id. at 536.
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community while also attending to the needs of juvenile offenders.325
The statute imposed fixed periods of confinement either for six-month
or twelve-month intervals, depending on the seriousness of the felony,
for juveniles committing certain enumerated offenses if restrictive
placement was thought necessary.326  While the decision to confine
was discretionary with the court, the period of confinement was fixed
by the statute once the court elected to confine the juvenile.327
The Felder court recognized that the jury trial right hinged upon
whether the mandatory dispositions constituted punishment.328  In
assessing that question, the court carefully attended to the punish-
ment/rehabilitation distinction329 and found the mandatory disposi-
tions to be punitive.330  The court emphasized that the statutes
premised the length of confinement on “the act committed rather than
[upon] the needs of the child.”331  The court saw the mandatory nature
of the confinements to be inconsistent with the “philosophy of treat-
ment,” which requires that juveniles be released at the moment reha-
bilitation occurs.332  The court elaborated:
The distinction between indeterminate and determinate sentencing is not se-
mantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies.  Indeterminate
sentencing is based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate sentenc-
ing is based upon a desire for retribution or punishment.
. . .  By mandating restrictive placement in a secure facility for a minimum
of six months, the Legislature has created a disposition that more nearly re-
sembles a punishment than a treatment . . . .333
The Felder court applied virtually the same conceptual framework
as suggested in this Article and reached the correct conclusion.  Be-
cause the New York legislature designated juvenile proceedings “civil”
in nature,334 juveniles asserting jury trial rights would be required to
show “by the clearest proof” that the dispositions were punitive,335 a
325. Id. at 531–32.
326. Conviction for committing “Class A” designated felonies required a twelve-month
restrictive placement while conviction of any other designated felony resulted in
a six-month restrictive placement. Id. at 532.
327. Id.
328. The court observed: “When . . . the protections provided to the juvenile criminal
offender have been so eroded away that what is actually a punishment is charac-
terized as a treatment, an abuse of constitutional dimension has occurred, and, a
jury trial is required before punishment, although appropriate, may be inflicted.”
Id. at 531.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 533.
331. Id.
332. Id. (“In effect the Legislature has determined that a child who at the time of his
dispositional hearing requires restrictive placement will continue to require re-
strictive placement for the entire period of the minimum sentence.”).
333. Id.
334. The legislature labeled the designated felony provisions as “juvenile” proceed-
ings, thus distinguishing them from criminal proceedings. Id. at 529.
335. See supra notes 49, 57–58 and accompanying text.
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burden they could easily meet.  As the Felder court pointed out, the
unpleasant restraints were imposed because of offenses and were pro-
portionate to their seriousness.  The determinate nature of the dispo-
sitions evidenced purposes of retribution and deterrence and belied
offender-oriented, rehabilitative concerns.336  The mandatory disposi-
tions at issue in Felder thus met all the characteristics of punishment
and none of rehabilitation.337
C. The Ongoing Viability of McKeiver
The fact that Felder and the recent Kansas L.M. decision338 con-
vincingly recognize the applicability of Sixth Amendment jury trial
rights to delinquency adjudications does not necessarily call McKeiver
into question. McKeiver’s denial of jury trial rights was decided on
due process grounds339 without considering whether juvenile disposi-
tions are punitive, thus triggering Sixth Amendment rights.340  In
fact, had the McKeiver Court addressed the Sixth Amendment issue
under the conceptual rubric developed in this Article, the Court would
have concluded that the dispositions at issue were nonpunitive under
the “clearest proof” requirement341 due to their indeterminate na-
336. See Felder, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
337. See supra notes 57–58.  Notwithstanding the convincing analysis of the Felder
court, other New York courts have reached the opposite conclusion, finding the
designated felony dispositions nonpunitive and rehabilitative in nature. See Peo-
ple v. Young, 416 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979); In re William M., 393
N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977).
338. See supra note 322.
339. McKeiver found that juvenile adjudications are essentially “fair” under due pro-
cess considerations even though they deny jury trial rights.  As Justice Brennan
explained: “[T]he States are not bound to provide jury trials on demand so long as
some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests . . . jury trials
are intended to serve.”  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).  Justice Brennan quoted Duncan v.
Louisiana for the proposition that “[a] criminal process which was fair and equi-
table but used no juries is easy to imagine.” Id. at 554 n.1 (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968)).
340. “McKeiver did not analyze the purported distinctions between treatment in juve-
nile courts and punishment in criminal courts.”  Feld, Constitutional Tension,
supra note 12, at 1148–49.
341. Even though the McKeiver Court saw it “wooden” and “simplistic[ ]” to call juve-
nile court proceedings either “civil” or “criminal,” 403 U.S. at 541 (plurality opin-
ion), such a characterization is necessary under the Court’s framework for
assessing punishment that it fully developed after McKeiver was decided. See
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (requiring the “clearest proof” threshold for
showing punishment when the legislature designates a disposition as a nonpuni-
tive civil sanction); supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.  At the time of
McKeiver, juvenile dispositions were legislatively deemed nonpunitive, thus trig-
gering the “clearest proof” requirement.
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 63
ture.342  Thus, whatever the merits of the Court’s denial of jury trial
rights as a matter of due process,343 juries would not have been re-
quired under the Sixth Amendment.  On the other hand—given the
markedly different juvenile justice landscape from the one encoun-
tered by the McKeiver Court—it is hoped that the Supreme Court will
soon address the jury trial issue raised in cases like J.K.,344 Cha-
vez,345 and Felder346 where punitive dispositions are clearly evident,
and find such situations to be criminal prosecutions requiring open
trials with jury determinations.
V. ABOLISH JUVENILE COURTS?
When the juvenile system becomes punitive, the Sixth Amendment
rights to public trials and trial by jury are required, making juvenile
courts virtually indistinguishable from criminal courts.  As Professor
Feld has observed, this “substantive and procedural convergence be-
tween juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all the concep-
tual and operational differences in strategies of criminal social control
for youths and adults.”347  For Feld, this means that no compelling
reasons exist to maintain separate juvenile and adult courts.  Feld and
others thus favor abolishing punitive juvenile courts and subjecting
all juveniles to criminal court jurisdiction with scaled-down penalties
to accommodate their diminished culpability.348  Others disagree and
argue that good reasons exist for retaining a separate system of juve-
nile courts, even if they administer punishment.349
In this section, I will briefly discuss the arguments on both sides of
the abolition debate.  I will then relate some matters explored in this
Article to the debate and argue, contrary to the abolitionists, that the
342. The dispositions at issue in McKeiver constituted possible confinement until the
juvenile reached the age of majority. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 542.  Such a disposi-
tion is nonpunitive under the conceptual framework developed in this Article.
See the discussion of In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1998), supra notes
300–21 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 12, 132–42 and accompanying text for criticism of McKeiver.
344. See supra notes 260–74 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 276–97 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 323–37 and accompanying text.
347. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 68–69.
348. Id.; see NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 106–07 (1971); Ains-
worth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts, supra note 12; Ainsworth, Youth Justice,
supra note 12; Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A
Proposal for the Preservation of Children’s Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23
(1990); Sanford J. Fox, Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 28 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 22
(1977); Francis Barry McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions Under the Juvenile
Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1093 (1977); Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Jus-
tice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1120
(1977).
349. See infra notes 359–63 and accompanying text.
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movement to punitive juvenile justice actually supports, rather than
contravenes, the existence of a separate juvenile court system.
A. The Argument for Abolition
Abolitionists argue that even if Sixth Amendment rights are ap-
plied in juvenile courts, the quality of procedural justice afforded in
those courts would still be vastly inferior to the quality available in
criminal court.350  For example, the right to counsel promised in In re
Gault has largely been unrealized as juveniles are routinely unrepre-
sented in delinquency proceedings.351  Even when attorneys do re-
present defendants in delinquency adjudications, the attorneys often
experience role tensions between acting as rigorous advocates, on the
one hand, and as guardians for their youthful clients on the other.352
Additionally, evidence suggests that juvenile property offenders
waived into adult criminal court, which constitute the majority of
waiver cases, receive shorter sentences for the same property offenses
committed by other juveniles sentenced in punitive juvenile courts.353
Such disparities raise obvious issues of sentencing policy fairness and
justice.354  These considerations lead abolitionists to conclude that no
coherent rationale remains for retaining a separate system for juve-
nile offenders once juvenile justice becomes punitive.355  Without a
meaningful rehabilitative underpinning, juvenile justice supposedly
loses its reason for existence.356
350. See, e.g., Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 1, at 913.
351. See Ainsworth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts, supra note 12, at 1126–30; Feld,
Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 87–90.
352. Ainsworth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts, supra note 12, at 1120, 1129–30.
353. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 80–81.
354. In addition to sentencing disparities, a bifurcated system arguably “undermines
the ability of the adult system to respond adequately to either persistent or vio-
lent young offenders.  Without an integrated record system that merges juvenile
with adult criminal histories, some chronic offenders may ‘slip through the
cracks’ and receive inappropriately lenient sentences as adults.” Id. at 81.
355. Janet Ainsworth has argued that the movement towards punitive juvenile justice
manifests a recognition that the sharp child-adult dichotomy assumed by the
originators of the juvenile court movement has broken down.  Adolescents are
viewed more as a subclass of adults than as a subclass of child.  Ainsworth, Youth
Justice, supra note 12, at 931–41.  If adolescents are not “essentially” different
from adults, “[t]he continued existence of a separate juvenile court system [is]
difficult . . . to sustain.” Id. at 936.  “With its philosophical underpinnings no
longer consonant with the current social construction of childhood, the juvenile
court now lacks a rationale for its continued existence other than sheer institu-
tional inertia.”  Ainsworth, Abolishing Juvenile Courts, supra note 12, at 1118.
356. As Professor Feld puts it, “once a state separates social welfare from criminal
social control, no role remains for a separate juvenile court for delinquency mat-
ters.”  Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 69.  Furthermore, any
attempts to “rehabilitate rehabilitation” through the juvenile court system,
whether explicitly punitive or not, are criticized as misguided.  As Feld argues, if
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Thus, for abolitionists, juvenile offenders should be handled exclu-
sively through the criminal justice system, where they will be afforded
the full array of procedural protections and affirmative defenses—in-
cluding the infancy defense.357  By scaling down its sentences from
those imposed on similarly situated adult offenders,358 abolitionists
argue the criminal system could easily accommodate the diminished
culpability of juveniles, thereby resulting in a single system dispens-
ing procedural and substantive justice without the defects of the pre-
sent juvenile system nor the inefficiencies of two separate systems.
B. The “Rehabilitate Rehabilitation” Argument Against
Abolition
Granting that juvenile courts dispense punishment, not everyone
agrees that the system should be abolished.  Some complain that abo-
litionists overstate the ability of criminal courts to effectively enforce
constitutionally mandated procedural protections.359  Furthermore,
we were to formulate child welfare policy ab initio we would not do so through a
court system making criminality a condition precedent to the receipt of services:
If we would not create a court to deliver social services, then does the
fact of a youth’s criminality confer upon a court any special competency
as a welfare agency?  Many young people who do not commit crimes des-
perately need social services and many youths who commit crimes do not
require or will not respond to social services.  In short, criminality repre-
sents an inaccurate and haphazard criterion upon which to allocate so-
cial services.  Because our society denies adequate help and assistance to
meet the social welfare needs of all young people, the juvenile court’s
treatment ideology serves primarily to legitimate the exercise of judicial
coercion of some because of their criminality.
Id. at 91.  Feld concludes “[c]ombining social welfare and penal social control
functions in one agency assures that the court does both badly.” Id. at 93.
Another commentator argues that adopting a single, unified criminal system
might actually result in a more effective and finely tuned system of individual-
ized sentencing. See Ainsworth, Youth Justice, supra note 12, at 945–50.
357. Despite the shift to punitive dispositions, juvenile courts “have been slow to rec-
ognize that the infancy defense is essential in justifying juvenile justice jurisdic-
tion over accused offenders.”  Walkover, supra note 1, at 506.  Walkover discusses
cases that deny application of the infancy defense on faulty appeals to the reha-
bilitative nature of juvenile justice. Id. at 547–51.  The defense has been recog-
nized, however, by the courts of some jurisdictions adopting the punitive model.
Id. at 551–54.
358. See Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 119–28 (arguing for a
“youth discount” in scaled down criminal court sentencing).
359. One commentator put the matter this way:
[T]he reality of adult criminal proceedings is crowded courtrooms in
which justice is dispensed through waivers and pleas negotiated by de-
fense attorneys who are often less than zealous and well-prepared advo-
cates, and in which racism is at least as much a fact of life as in juvenile
court.  For the most part, the typical criminal court in urban areas is a
harsh, tough, mean institution cranking out pleas, with few pauses for
individualized attention.  It is no place for an adult defendant to be,
much less a child.
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criminal courts will arguably be less able than juvenile courts to ac-
commodate youthful immaturity in meting out sentences, even ones
scaled down from adult penalties.360
Other proponents of rehabilitation argue that meaningful rehabili-
tation is not inconsistent with a punitive juvenile justice system.
Some claim effective rehabilitation results through the utilization of
“serious and habitual juvenile offender” statutes (“SHJO”) in which
offenders are incarcerated for an initial sentence, after which they un-
dergo intensive supervision for significant periods of time in order to
receive rehabilitative services.361  Also, anti-abolitionists often con-
tend that more resources should be devoted to rehabilitative systems.
As Professor Rosenberg argues: “Abandoning the juvenile court is an
admission that its humane purposes were misguided or unattaina-
ble. . . .  We should stay and fight—fight for a reordering of societal
resources, one that will protect and nourish children.”362  She adds:
Despite all their failings, of which there are many, the juvenile courts do af-
ford benefits that are unlikely to be replicated in the criminal courts, such as
the institutionalized intake diversionary system, anonymity, diminished
stigma, shorter sentences, and recognition of rehabilitation as a viable goal.
We should build on these strengths rather than abandon ship.363
C. Punitive Juvenile Justice as a Reason for Retaining
Separate Juvenile and Criminal Courts
As noted above, abolitionists argue that juvenile courts lose their
underlying rationale once they become punitive.  So apparent is this
conclusion that Professor Feld has observed: “[F]ew juvenile court pro-
ponents even attempt any longer to defend the institution on its own
merits.”364  I will join the few and argue that rather than diminishing
the role of a separate juvenile court system, the movement to punitive
juvenile justice actually provides, perhaps paradoxically, unique
grounds for retaining a separate system.
In the first place, as shown by this Article, punitive juvenile courts
should be subject to the public jury trial protections of the Sixth
Amendment.  These protections—even more extensive than those af-
forded defendants in criminal court—will go a long way towards alle-
viating the problems that have traditionally rendered juvenile
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile
Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 173–74 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
360. Id. at 174–75.
361. Sheffer, supra note 74, at 495–506.
362. Rosenberg, supra note 359, at 184 (footnote omitted).  For similar arguments
favoring separate juvenile and criminal systems, see Forst & Blomquist, supra
note 10, at 335–36, 359–69.
363. Rosenberg, supra note 359, at 184–85 (footnotes omitted).
364. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 96.
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 67
proceedings inferior to criminal courts.365  Once juvenile proceedings
are understood as Sixth Amendment criminal prosecutions, the prob-
lem of attorney role ambivalence, which has plagued traditional juve-
nile justice,366 would be resolved because defense counsel will realize
they have only one role, that of defending their youthful clients in the
same manner attorneys advocate for criminal defendants.367
Even if all the procedural failings of the juvenile system are recti-
fied, however, some would argue that the system should still be elimi-
nated through an application of Occam’s Razor in the name of
efficiency.368  Arguably, all the benefits of the juvenile system could be
accommodated in a single criminal system.369  Of the benefits noted
by Professor Rosenberg,370 the criminal system could adopt diversion-
ary intake procedures,371 mandate shorter sentences for youthful of-
fenders,372 and adopt rehabilitative programs such as SHJO
provisions if deemed desirable.373  These claims notwithstanding, it is
doubtful whether revising the criminal system to achieve these bene-
fits would be worth the costs involved, rather than simply retaining
the present juvenile system, where the benefits are arguably already
available and administered by court personnel experienced in working
with young people.374
365. See supra notes 132–42, 151–55, 166–77, 194–209, 215–50 and accompanying
text.  If the rights to waive public trial and jury trial rights, argued for in this
Article, are realized, juveniles will actually enjoy more procedural protections in
delinquency adjudications than offenders in criminal court.
366. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
367. As this Article has shown, when juvenile courts dispense punishment, they be-
come “criminal prosecutions,” triggering Sixth Amendment rights, including
those assuring the “assistance of counsel.” See supra note 39.
368. See McCarthy, supra note 348, at 1118 (arguing that since less severe juvenile
sanctions in punitive models are routinely “determined by reference to the adult
penalty, it would be more efficient to preserve the distinction between adult and
youth sentencing by incorporating it into a criminal statute than by maintaining
a separate juvenile system”).
369. For example, it would be possible to allow the special waiver rights for juveniles
argued for in this Article, see supra note 365, to be applicable in criminal courts if
the juvenile system were eliminated.
370. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
371. See Wizner & Keller, supra note 348, at 1133.
372. See McCarthy, supra note 348, at 1118; Wizner & Keller, supra note 348, at 1133;
supra note 358 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
374. Some proponents of punitive juvenile justice with a rehabilitative component
argue:
The most effective means to implement the lessons from developmen-
tal psychology is to maintain a system of adjudication and disposition
that is separate from the adult criminal justice system.  First, a juvenile
court can better recognize and accommodate the reduced culpability and
more limited trial competence of younger offenders.  Moreover, a sepa-
rate juvenile correctional system is more likely to utilize dispositional
strategies, goals, and approaches that are grounded in developmental
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However, even if these desirable aspects of the present juvenile
courts could be achieved with a merger into criminal court, some bene-
fits of the present two-system situation appear particularly difficult to
replicate if the juvenile system is abolished.  The benefit of retaining
the current connotation of the delinquency label is of particular impor-
tance.  If, as the Supreme Court has clearly recognized, adolescent of-
fenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts,375 juveniles
should no more be saddled with the same stigma imposed upon adult
offenders than with the same punishment.
Although perhaps not provable by empirical research, it appears
obvious to many that the stigma attached to delinquents adjudicated
in juvenile court is less severe than that attending conviction in crimi-
nal courts.376  While being labeled “delinquent” is surely stigmatic,377
it seems clear that the stigma carries fewer negative connotations—
knowledge. . . .  The ability or inclination of the criminal justice system
to tailor its response to juvenile crime so as to utilize the lessons of devel-
opmental psychology is questionable.  The evidence suggests that politi-
cal pressure functions as a one-way ratchet, in the direction of ever-
stiffer penalties.  Programs designed for adolescents and sentencing dis-
tinctions between adults and juveniles will be much harder to maintain
in a unified system in which juveniles are otherwise treated as adults; it
seems predictable that the lines between age groups will become
blurred.
Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 188–89.
375. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
376. In discussing why a separate juvenile court should be retained even if it dis-
penses punishment, one commentator observed:
If shorter sentences were all that were involved, there would be no
need for a separate juvenile court; criminal court judges could simply
take a juvenile’s age into account in setting the sentence.  But more is
involved.  Juveniles’ capacity for change means that less stigma should
be attached to conviction and punishment of a juvenile than of an adult;
a teenager’s criminality should not hang over him like a cloud for the
rest of his life.  Although it would be naı¨ve to suggest that the juvenile
court has eliminated stigmatization, as its early advocates had hoped,
the stigma nonetheless is milder and less enduring that that provided by
the criminal courts.
CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 356 (1978).
“[T]he end result of a declaration of delinquency ‘is significantly different from
and less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt.’ ”  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 540 (1971) (quoting In re Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1970)).
Another commentator concluded that “the stigma of being classified a delinquent
has been overestimated.”  Note, supra note 227, at 1157.
But see Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1231 (1970) (stating a “juvenile delinquent is viewed as a
junior criminal hardly less threatening . . . than his more mature counterpart”);
McCarthy, supra note 26, at 213 (“[A] stigma attaches to a delinquent in a man-
ner similar to an adult criminal.”). See also supra note 107 and accompanying
text (showing In re Gault Court equating the delinquent and criminal labels).
377. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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both in the minds of offenders378 and to the community at large—than
those that flow from being convicted a “criminal” in the adult court.379
The fact that the vast majority of young people who commit criminal
acts during the period of their minority grow out of their deviance
upon reaching adulthood,380 means the “delinquent” label connotes
understandable, even normal, behavior.381  But for good luck, the la-
bel would be attached to virtually everyone.  Furthermore, given the
accelerating practice of waiving serious juvenile offenders to criminal
court,382 the delinquency label connotes not simply that the individual
offender is like everyone else, but also that he or she may well have
committed a relatively minor offense.383  None of this follows when
one is stigmatized “criminal,” a label connoting neither immature folly
378. See Jack Donald Foster et al., Perceptions of Stigma Following Public Interven-
tion for Delinquent Behavior, 20 SOC. PROBS. 202 (1972) (finding that only a few
boys adjudicated delinquent felt seriously handicapped by their encounter with
the juvenile court relative to their interpersonal relationships with family,
friends, or teachers).
379. See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39
J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996) (discussing ways in which convicted criminals suffer
stigma manifested through the reluctance of others to interact with them eco-
nomically and socially).
380. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.  This does not mean, however,
that such young people found guilty of acts of delinquency should not be punished
for their wrongdoing.  Developmental psychologists recognize the importance of
lessons in accountability amounting to more than mere slaps on the wrist.  Scott
& Grisso, supra note 19, at 187.  “The fact that many youthful offenders will de-
sist in their criminal activity as they mature does not justify a license to offend
during adolescence.” Id.  Franklin Zimring expresses similar views:
[N]o learning role is complete without, in some measure, learning re-
sponsibility for conduct.  Thus, part of the initiation into the adult role is
building toward adult responsibilities.  Just as the learning theory of ad-
olescence implies a transition toward adulthood, so too it also implies a
progression toward adult levels of responsibility.  The adolescent must
be protected from the full burden of adult responsibilities, but pushed
along by degrees toward the moral and legal accountability that we con-
sider appropriate to adulthood.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 95–96
(1982).
382. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
383. Theorists point out that there exists a tendency for the term “criminal” to “over
label” through its failure to describe precise types of deviant behavior(s) trigger-
ing the label, the seriousness of those behaviors, or their social context.  Ronald
A. Feldman, Legal Lexicon, Social Labeling, and Juvenile Rehabilitation, 2 OF-
FENDER REHABILITATION 19, 24–25 (1977).  The term “delinquent,” on the other
hand, connotes an offense committed by a minor which, while perhaps serious, is
at least not serious enough to merit disposition in criminal court.  As one com-
mentator observed: “When a juvenile is transferred and tried in adult court, the
consequences of criminal conviction are readily apparent and warrant a vigorous
defense, but for a child facing a delinquency adjudication, the criminal conse-
quences of his or her adjudication may not be clear.”  Fain, supra note 12, at 523.
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nor minor offense.384  Therefore, punishing youthful dalliances with
wrongful conduct makes more sense within a system expressly de-
voted to such.385
Abolitionists argue that the emergence of punitive juvenile justice
spells the demise of a separate juvenile court system.  To the contrary,
the considerations raised above provide a rationale supporting the
separate existence of punitive juvenile courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment assures a right to a public trial for those
accused of committing punishable offenses and a right to a jury trial
when possible punishment exceeds six-months imprisonment.  Histor-
ically, these rights were unavailable in delinquency adjudications be-
cause the dispositional consequences of such were deemed
nonpunitive.  The juvenile justice system was from its inception un-
derstood to constitute a rehabilitative alternative to the punitive crim-
inal justice system.  However, as is now well documented, juvenile
justice, whatever its original nature, has in many jurisdictions become
punitive, thus raising obvious Sixth Amendment public jury trial
implications.
This Article has explored those implications by tracing the evolu-
tion of juvenile justice from its original roots in the rehabilitative ideal
to its present punitive orientation.  The Article has shown that while
the Supreme Court has yet to speak to the Sixth Amendment conse-
quences of the movement to punitive juvenile justice, a host of lower
courts have addressed the matter.  As illustrated by a consideration of
a sample of cases, an overwhelming majority of lower courts inade-
quately address the fundamental issue of whether a given disposition
is punitive, a necessary aspect of determining the applicability of
Sixth Amendment public jury trial rights in juvenile court proceed-
ings.  By neglecting to even address the issue, or by applying inade-
384. See supra notes 379, 383.
385. It might be argued that even the advantages of retaining the delinquent/criminal
distinction could be retained by creating a “delinquent division” within the crimi-
nal system.  However, it seems likely that within such a system significant blur-
ring of the distinction between “delinquents” and “criminals” would still occur.
Convictions within the “delinquency division” would still be convictions by “crimi-
nal” courts.  Rather than risking an experiment with criminal court delinquency
divisions, the following seems wiser:
For a broad range of juvenile offenders however, utilitarian and retribu-
tive arguments converge to support adjudication and disposition in a
separate juvenile justice system.  Such a system, grounded in develop-
mental principles, not only can function more coherently and effectively
to achieve the complex societal objectives at stake, but also stands as a
powerful symbol that most young offenders are different from their adult
counterparts.
Scott & Grisso, supra note 19, at 189.
2012] PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 71
quate definitions of punishment, the courts routinely fail to recognize
the public jury trial protections to which juveniles facing punitive dis-
positions are entitled.
I have offered a remedy to this judicial maladroitness by present-
ing a conceptual framework which, if utilized, would enable future
courts to draw the necessary distinction between punitive and rehabil-
itative dispositions in determining the applicability of Sixth Amend-
ment public trial and jury trial rights in juvenile court.  Recognition of
Sixth Amendment rights in delinquency adjudications, with the
waiver rights argued for in this Article, affords juveniles even greater
protections than those available in adult criminal courts, thus erasing
the common characterization of juvenile courts as second class tribu-
nals imposing sanctions similar to those of criminal courts without af-
fording their full array of procedural protections.  I have shown that
bringing Sixth Amendment protections to delinquency adjudications
where punitive dispositions are at stake is not only constitutionally
necessary, but sound on policy grounds.
Some have maintained that juvenile courts become redundant once
they become punitive, and thus should be merged into criminal courts.
I have argued to the contrary; the emergence of punitive juvenile
courts in fact manifests its own raison d’etre, separate from criminal
courts.  With the availability of Sixth Amendment protections, juve-
nile courts could operate as procedurally fair vehicles for holding
juveniles accountable for their wrongful actions within a system at-
tending to their unique status as young people, while at the same time
protecting them from the harshness and stigmatization inherent in
the criminal justice system.
